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INTRODUCTION

This Article proposes a new paradigm for analyzing the role of
precedent in constitutional law. The conventional perspective equates
precedent with judicial decisions, particularly those of the Supreme
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Court,1 and almost totally ignores the constitutional significance of
precedents made by public authorities other than courts. 2 Yet, nonjudicial actors produce precedents that are more pervasive than those
made by courts in constitutional law. Non-judicial precedents are not
only confined to the backwaters of constitutional law, but they also
pertain to serious constitutional matters-presidential succession,
secession, congressional power to remove Presidents and Justices, and
the respective authorities of the President and Congress to regulate
war, just to name a few.
By reenvisioning constitutional law through the lens of nonjudicial precedent, this Article develops several new insights into
constitutional law generally and precedent in particular. First,
shifting perspective improves the precision and clarity of the terms we
employ in constitutional analysis. I define non-judicial precedents as
any past constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors that courts or
other public authorities imbue with normative authority. Once we
understand non-judicial precedents in this way, they are more
recognizable, and, in turn, their constitutional significance is more
apparent.
Second, shifting our perspective from that of the courts to that
of other actors illuminates the considerable influence of non-judicial
precedents in constitutional law. The Supreme Court is shaped by
non-judicial precedents on its size, composition, jurisdiction, and
funding; these non-judicial precedents take such diverse forms as
administrative and historical practices, tradition, norms, culture, and

1.
See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (8th ed. 2004) (defining precedent as either
"[t]he making of law by a court in recognizing and applying new rules while administering
justice" or "[a] decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar
facts or issues"). For social scientists' understandings of precedent, see, e.g., THOMAS G.
HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 5

(2006) (defining precedent as "the legal doctrines, principles, or rules established by prior court
opinions").
2.
The few legal scholars who take non-judicial decisionmaking seriously do not analyze it
comprehensively or in concrete, easily measurable forms such as precedent. See, e.g., Robert C.
Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8-11 (2003) (defining "culture" as "the beliefs of nonjudicial actors" that influenced recent Supreme Court decisions on the scope of the Congress's
power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Mark V. Tushnet, Non-Judicial
Review, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 453, 455 (2003) (comparing how non-judicial review of
constitutional questions works here and abroad); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 780 (2002)
(arguing that theories of judicial supremacy improperly discount the significance of extrajudicial
constitutional interpretation).
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custom. 3 On constitutional matters that courts never review, nonjudicial precedents are the dominant currency.
Third, appreciating the constitutional significance of nonjudicial precedents is instrumental to solving prominent debates
among theorists (and public officials) about judicial supremacy, 4 the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty," 5 and imperfect or incomplete
implementation of constitutional values. Missing in these debates is a
positive account of non-judicial precedents that emphasizes their
pervasiveness and power in constitutional law.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the one
characteristic which all non-judicial precedents share: their
discoverability-the culmination of public efforts made to invest
certain past non-judicial activities with normative force. To illustrate
the essential importance of discoverability, I contrast three cases in
which it is easy to spot non-judicial precedents with three in which it
is difficult, if not impossible, to claim non-judicial activities as
precedents.
Part II examines several other features distinguishing nonjudicial precedents from each other and from judicial precedents.
First, there is a remarkable range and variety of non-judicial
precedents. They extend over a much broader range of constitutional
issues than do judicial precedents and may be categorized in many
different ways. They differ in terms of the institutions producing
them, the forms they take, and the different authorities for their
construction. A second distinctive feature of non-judicial precedents is
their timing. Frequently, they pre-exist judicially created
constitutional doctrine and thus govern and shape particular
constitutional matters unless or until they are addressed by courts.
Third, non-judicial precedents are surprisingly enduring. Very few of
the constitutional judgments of non-judicial authorities are subject to
judicial review. Courts not only uphold an overwhelming number of

3.
See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999).

CONSTITUTIONAL

CONSTRUCTION:

DIVIDED

4.
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 348 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding
the "arrogance" of the majority, and accusing it of using its own judgment to reach its ruling that
the Eighth Amendment bars executions of people with cognitive disabilities found guilty of
certain crimes); Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE
SUPREME COURT 55, 57 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (describing the Bush
v. Gore Court's intervention as "swaggeringly confident"); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub and
Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 288 (2001)
(claiming that "[tlhe Court's self-confidence in matters constitutional is matched only by its
disdain for the meaningful participation of other actors in constitutional debate").
5.
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (2d ed. 1986).

2008]

NON-JUDICIAL PRECEDENT

non-judicial activities they review, but they also defer to non-judicial
precedents in various forms, such as historical practices, traditions,
and customs. The fourth distinctive feature of non-judicial precedents
is their design or the direction of their influence. Because of their
design, non-judicial precedents may impact public institutions in
various ways. They may be designed to operate vertically-as a
binding mandate imposed by a superior authority on an inferior oneor horizontally- as persuasive authority across public institutions. A
final distinctive feature of non-judicial precedents is their limited path
dependency. Despite their easy discoverability, non-judicial precedents
have a limited capacity to foreclose or maintain certain choices or
outcomes 6 because of their forms and the purposes for which they have
been created or cited.
Part III examines the multiple functions of non-judicial
7
precedents, besides their role as binding or persuasive authority.
These functions include settling legal disputes, serving as modes of
constitutional argumentation, facilitating national dialogues on
constitutional law, stabilizing or achieving equilibrium in
constitutional law, and shaping national identity, judicial doctrine,
and constitutional culture and history. The more often precedents are
cited approvingly, the more their meaning and value increase. The
citation patterns of judicial and non-judicial precedents are interconnected, as their meaning and value often depend on the frequency
with which they are cited positively by courts and non-judicial
authorities.
The final Part examines the normative implications of my
positive account of non-judicial precedent. First, the multiple
functions of non-judicial precedents largely expose the exaggeration of
the counter-majoritarian difficulty in constitutional theory because
most of the Court's constitutional decisions are grounded in some
expression of majoritarian preferences-custom, tradition, historical
practices, the text of the Constitution, or judicial precedent (as
approved by most Justices over time). Judicial precedents conflicting
with non-judicial precedents are the most vulnerable to political
attacks. Second, non-judicial precedents are instrumental to
implementing constitutional values. Incomplete, or imperfect,
implementation of constitutional values results from tensions among
6.
See generally Paul A. David, HistoricalEconomics in the Longrun: Some Implications of
Path-Dependence, in HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN ECONOMICS 29, 29 (Graeme Donald Snooks ed.,
1993) (describing path dependency as the inability to "shake off the effects of past events").
7.
On the multiple functions of judicial precedents, see Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes
about Attitudes, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1733, 1761-62 (2003) (reviewing H. SPAETH & J. SEGAL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002)).
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non-judicial precedents or between judicial and non-judicial decisions.
Third, the proliferation and endurance of non-judicial precedents
contradict claims of judicial supremacy. Not only do courts heavily
depend on (and defer to) non-judicial precedents, but the domain of
non-judicial activities that elude judicial review dwarfs that of judicial
precedents. When one further recognizes that non-judicial precedents
settle many constitutional conflicts as important as-if not more
important than-those settled by judicial precedents, it is apparent
that judicial supremacy is not a fact of our constitutional life.
The Article concludes by arguing that a shift in perspective
from the Court to non-judicial actors allows us to see constitutional
law in new ways. It illuminates the connections among constitutional
activities, which seem to have little in common, but in fact are
connected by non-judicial precedent-events ranging from the
seemingly mundane to the monumental. These events illustrate why
non-judicial actors, not the Court, are supreme in making
constitutional law.
I. DISCOVERABILITY AS THE COMMON FEATURE OF NON-JUDICIAL
PRECEDENTS
Not every non-judicial activity qualifies as a precedent. When,
for instance, George Washington acknowledged that, as the nation's
first President, "[t]here is scarcely any part of my conduct which may
not hereafter be drawn into precedent,"8 it seems improbable that
everything he did should count as a precedent. Surely, what he ate for
breakfast and how long he slept are not precedents, but why not?
Similarly, when then-Representative Bob Barr declared that "the
precedents we set in [the Clinton impeachment proceedings] will
remain part and parcel of our legal system for years to come,"9 it is
doubtful everything done in those proceedings has precedential value.
Some events, but not others, comprise precedents-but which ones? It
is reasonable to resist adopting a notion of non-judicial precedent so
capacious that it counts every non-judicial activity as a precedent, as
this would deprive the concept of any meaning or manageability.
While all non-judicial activities have the potential to become
precedents, only those non-judicial activities that are discoverable
count as precedents. It is discoverability-the culmination of public
8.
Letter from George Washington to Catherine Macauley Graham (Jan. 9, 1790), in 30
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799,
at 495, 496 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
9.
Background and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitutionof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Rep. Barr).
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efforts to invest certain non-judicial activities with normative forcethat transforms non-judicial activities into precedents. These efforts
may be undertaken at any time-when non-judicial activities first
take place or later. Public efforts to empower non-judicial acts with
normative authority make these acts discoverable, and their
discoverability makes them recognizable as precedents. Thus, it is
impossible for something that is not discoverable to become a
precedent, as no one knows about it, much less has tried to invest it
with normative power. What President Washington ate for breakfast
is not a precedent because neither he nor anyone else tried to imbue it
with special authority. Similarly, in the Clinton impeachment
proceedings, only those things that public authorities then or later
tried to invest with normative power constitute precedents. Thus,
discoverability is a useful means to separate non-judicial activities
that count as precedents from those that do not.
The discoverability of non-judicial precedents is a consequence
of their network effects. 10 The normative authority of non-judicial
activities, just like that of judicial precedents, is linked to the
frequency with which they are cited. The more often that public
authorities, including courts, cite or seek to invest past non-judicial
activities with normative power, the more discoverable the activities
become, and the more their meaning and value increase. Because not
all non-judicial authorities employ the same citation practices or feel
the same compulsion as courts to explain their decisions through
reasoned elaboration, it is not surprising that some non-judicial
activities are harder to find than others. In the next two Sections, I
illustrate how frequency of citation and other public efforts to invest
certain non-judicial activities with normative force differentiate the
cases in which non-judicial precedents are easily identified from those
in which they are not.
A. Three Easy Cases
In this Section, I discuss three easily discoverable non-judicial
precedents. These precedents are easy to spot because of repetition,
formal codification, and consistent, longstanding public recognition
and construction.

10. On network effects, see generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting(Or, "The Economics of Boilerplate'),83 VA. L. REV. 713
(1997); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Economic Network Effects, 86
CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
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1. Vice Presidential Succession to the Presidency
When President William Henry Harrison died a month after
his inauguration, 1 the legal status of Vice President John Tyler was
in doubt. Because Harrison was the first President to die in office,
there was no precedent to guide Tyler or the nation. 12 Nor was there
any consensus on how the constitutional provision governing
presidential succession should be construed. 13 The pertinent provision
was notoriously ambiguous:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
shall act accordingly, until the
what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer
14
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The question was whether "the same" referred to the office of
the presidency or to the President's particular powers and duties.
Prominent authorities had divided over whether a Vice President
automatically should become President and continue as such until the
expiration of the term or that a Vice President could only act as
President upon a sitting President's death, having no entitlement to
claim the office for himself because he had not been formally elected
President.15
Because Tyler was home in Williamsburg, Virginia when
Harrison died, the cabinet and congressional leaders had at least a
day to ponder his constitutional status before he returned to the
nation's capital. 16 Henry Clay, the Whig leader in the Senate, initially
believed that the powers and duties of the office of the presidency, but
not the office itself, devolved on Tyler.17 Harrison's cabinet agreed
with Clay and addressed Tyler as Vice President in its first contact
with him following Harrison's death.1 8 Just before Tyler arrived in
Washington, D.C., Secretary of State Daniel Webster had asked the
11. EDWARD P. CRAPOL, JOHN TYLER: THE ACCIDENTAL PRESIDENT 8 (2006).
12. NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON AND JOHN
TYLER 41-42 (1989).

13. See id. at 45-47 (describing various proposed constructions, and noting that "by 1841 no
conclusion had been reached").
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
15. See RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 38-41 (1951) (discussing the different
positions taken before 1841 by prominent authorities such as Joseph Story, William Rawle, and
James Kent on a vice-president's constitutional status upon the death of a sitting president).
16. See CRAPOL, supra note 11, at 8-10 (noting that it took Tyler twenty-four hours to make
the trip to Washington).
17. See SILVA, supra note 15, at 21.
18. See id. at 16.
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clerk of the Supreme Court to relay a message requesting Chief
Justice Roger Taney's counsel on the proper constitutional procedure,
but Taney demurred.' 9
Tyler arrived in Washington on April 6, 1841, with a wellconceived strategy in mind. 20 His first order of business was to meet
with the six members of Harrison's cabinet. He believed, and likely
told the Cabinet members unequivocally that he believed, that the
office of the presidency and all its power and duties fully devolved on
him at the moment of Harrison's death. 2 1 When Webster mentioned
Harrison's custom of making decisions on the basis of a majority vote
of his cabinet, Tyler rejected the practice because he did not believe
that cabinet members were co-equal with the President. 22 Tyler vowed
that he "would never consent to being dictated to" by his cabinet. 23 By
the end of the meeting, the cabinet agreed to recognize Tyler as the
24
duly authorized President of the United States.
Tyler's next step was to take a public oath to certify his claim
to the presidency. 25 Although Tyler believed his succession was
automatic, he agreed to take the oath of office with the entire cabinet
present at the persistent urging of the presiding judge, William
Cranch of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia. 26 Cranch
believed that the new oath was necessary to dispel any doubts about
the legality of Tyler's status. 27 Cranch appended a statement of his
beliefs to the copy of the oath he administered to Tyler, along with
Tyler's objection. 28 Three days later, Tyler delivered an inaugural
address in which he explained why he believed he had succeeded to
the presidency and referred to himself several times as "Chief
Magistrate" and "President."29 Almost immediately thereafter, Tyler
moved into the White House, called for a public day of prayer and
fasting to honor Harrison's memory, and met with several foreign

19. PETERSON, supra note 12, at 47.
20. CRAPOL, supra note 11, at 10.
21. See id. (discussing 'Tyler's unwavering certainty that he was now the nation's
president" and his "unexpected decisiveness" in the Cabinet meeting).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. ("[T]he entire cabinet agreed to his stipulations and remained on board to serve
their new chief.").
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28.

PETERSON, supranote 12, at 48.

29.

John Tyler, Inaugural Address (Apr. 9, 1861), in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES

AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 36-39 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
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ministers to allay international concerns about the lawfulness of the
30
power transfer.
Nevertheless, some doubts persisted in Congress, in part
because the Whigs and Democrats were confused about where Tyler
stood on the great constitutional issues of the day. 31 A little less than
two months after Tyler took the presidential oath, Congress held a
special session in which it formally addressed Tyler's status.3 2 On May
31, 1841, Representative Henry Wise of Virginia proposed a resolution
referring to Tyler as the President of the United States. 33 After a
heated exchange, the resolution passed without any change in
wording. 34 Ohio's two senators led a protest against Tyler's succession
on the following day.3 5 After some debate, the Senate voted 38-8 to
recognize Tyler as the President. 36 This generally settled the matter,
although some people, including John Quincy Adams, persisted in
calling Tyler "Acting President,"3 7 and others called him "His
Accidency." 38 Even near the end of Tyler's presidency, some detractors
continued to address letters to Tyler as "Vice-President-Acting
39
President," and he routinely returned them unopened.
Tyler's succession to the presidency became a precedent
because of the concerted efforts of Tyler and other national leaders to
make it one. They knew that people facing the same circumstances in
the future would seek guidance from what Tyler did immediately after
Harrison's death; thus, they took great pains to construct a precedent
that would withstand the test of time. 40 After Tyler left office, seven

30.
31.

CRAPOL, supra note 11, at 12-13.
See id. at 18-19 (describing Tyler's refusal to go along with various Whig initiatives);

YANEK MIECZKOWSKI, THE ROUTLEDGE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 39

(2001) (noting that Tyler had been a Democrat originally, but had switched over to the Whig
party on account of President Jackson's Bank veto); SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 524-26 (2005) (describing significant clashes between Whig
leader Henry Clay and President Tyler).
32. SILVA, supra note 15, at 22.
33. PETERSON, supra note 12, at 49.
34. Id. at 50.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. CRAPOL, supra note 11, at 10.
38. PETERSON, supranote 12, at 50.
39. CRAPOL, supranote 11, at 10.
40. See id. at 16 (noting that Tyler justified his actions as a "demonstrat[ion] to the nation
and the world that American constitutional procedures for a peaceful transfer of executive power
worked").
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Vice Presidents followed Tyler's example. 41 The repetition reinforced
Tyler's succession as a precedent, and, in 1967, Tyler's precedent was42
officially codified with the adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
In the only application of this amendment, Gerald Ford became
President when Richard Nixon resigned from office in 1974.
2. Presidential Signing Statements
While President George W. Bush's signing statements have
been controversial, 43 their status as non-judicial precedents is easy to
establish. In the course44of exercising their constitutional authority to
"sign" bills into law
and fulfilling their constitutional oath,
with
James Monroe, have exercised the
Presidents, beginning
prerogative to issue public statements along with their signatures on
bills. 45 The commonality of signing statements intensified with
President Reagan who issued 250 of them, eighty-six of which
contained provisions questioning the constitutionality of one or more
of the statutory provisions signed into law.4 6 President George H.W.
Bush issued 228 signing statements, 107 of which raised
constitutional objections. 47 President Clinton issued 381 signing
statements, seventy of which raised constitutional concerns or
objectives. 48 While President George W. Bush has rendered 152
signing statements as of the beginning of August 2007, 118 of thesethe largest percentage of any President's-contain constitutional
49
challenges or objections to more than 1,000 statutory provisions.
41. The seven other vice-presidents who succeeded to the presidency are Millard Fillmore
(1850), Andrew Johnson (1865), Chester Arthur (1881), Theodore Roosevelt (1901), Calvin
Coolidge (1923), Harry Truman (1945), and Lyndon Johnson (1963).
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 ("In case of the removal of the President from office or
of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.").
43. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Powers of
His Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at Al (discussing legal scholars' and Congress's
responses to Bush's use of signing statements and assertion of power).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections
to that House in which it shall have originated ... ").
PRESIDENTIAL
45. T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2007).

SIGNING

STATEMENTS:

46. See id. at 3.
47. See id. at 5.
48. See id. at 6.
49. Id. at 9; see also Morning Edition: House Studies Impact of Bush "Signing Statements"
(NPR radio broadcast Feb. 1, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 1948387 (providing slightly
different numbers, current through February 2007: 126 signing statements, posing constitutional
challenges or objections to more than 800 statutory provisions).
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Many of these signing statements have provoked criticism in the
media and Congress. 50 An American Bar Association Commission
issued a report protesting that the signing statements were unlawful
presidential attempts to create legislative history, to extend the scope
of the President's power beyond its limits, or to refuse to enforce laws
that he should have been obliged to enforce because he had signed
51
them.
The controversy over signing statements does not necessarily
diminish them as precedents. To the contrary, the controversy merely
has called more public attention to them and thus has made them
more discoverable. The discoverability of presidential signing
statements as precedents turns on Presidents' public efforts to assert
them as presidential prerogative, to use them to send signals or to
bind executive officials, and to get others to accept their legitimacy. As
long as the opinions expressed in signing statements are just opinions,
their only legal significance is as persuasive authority to Congress,
executive officials, states, and subsequent Presidents. Efforts to
implement the opinions-for instance, through vetoes or executive
orders-are acts separate from signing the statements, and they have
different legal force and consequences than the opinions expressed in
the statements.
3. The Non-Impeachability of Members of Congress
Another easy non-judicial precedent to spot is the first federal
impeachment. On July 7, 1797, the House of Representatives
impeached former Senator William Blount, a Tennessee Federalist. 52
The House impeached Blount based on evidence provided by President
John Adams that Blount had attempted to help the British capture
Spanish-controlled Florida and Louisiana by inciting Creek and
Cherokee Indians to attack the Spanish settlers there. 53 The House
50. See, e.g., Morning Edition: House Studies Impact of Bush "SigningStatements," supra
note 49 (discussing Congressional concern over Bush's actions).
51. See HALSTEAD, supra note 45, at 1 (quoting the ABA report's criticisms of Bush's use of
signing statements). For a discussion on Bush's reasoning for using signing statements, see
Philip J. Cooper, George W Bush, Edgar Allan Poe and the Use and Abuse of Presidential
Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515, 522 (2005) (characterizing the constitutional
objections raised by President Bush as falling across seventeen categories, ranging from
generalized assertions of presidential authority to supervise the "unitary executive branch" to
federalism limits imposed on Congress by the Supreme Court).
52. See 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 459 (1797); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:
THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 275-81 (1997); BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT 11620 (1998).

53.

See MELTON, supra note 52, at 89-120; CURRIE, supra note 52, at 275-76.
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principally charged Blount with engaging in a conspiracy to
compromise the neutrality of the United States in flagrant disregard
54
of the Constitution's distribution of authority over foreign affairs.
The next day the Senate expelled Blount by a vote of 25-1. 55 When the
Senate began its impeachment trial against Blount several months
later, Blount's lawyers challenged the Senate's jurisdiction on three
grounds. 56 First, they argued that because Blount was no longer a
senator, the Senate no longer had jurisdiction to convict, remove, or
disqualify him. 57 Second, they argued that senators were not
impeachable, because only "civil officers of the United States" were
impeachable 58 and that senators were not "civil officers of the United
States." 59 Third, they argued that because his misconduct was strictly
personal and involved no abuse of official powers, it did not provide
the proper basis for his impeachment, much less his removal and
disqualification. 60 On January 10, 1798, the Senate voted 14-11 to
defeat a resolution declaring that Blount was a "civil officer" and
therefore subject to impeachment. 61 On January 11, 1798, the Senate
voted, by the same margin, to dismiss the impeachment articles
against Blount because he no longer held office and, on January 14,
1798, again voted 14-11 to dismiss the impeachment resolution
62
against Blount for lack of jurisdiction.
Public authorities and commentators then and since have
construed the first basis on which the Senate voted to dismiss Blount's
impeachment-that members of Congress are not impeachable-as
the most significant.63 While the Senate's vote dismissing jurisdiction
over Blount's impeachment bound the Senate and other public
authorities at the time, members of Congress and most scholars then
and since have maintained its significance as precedent. Until
senators rule differently on whether members of Congress are

54.

See MELTON, supra note 52, at 156.

55. Id. at 125-26.
56. CURRIE, supra note 52, at 277.
57. Id.; MELTON, supra note 52, at 207.
58. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
59. CURRIE, supra note 52, at 277; MELTON, supra note 52, at 207.
60. CURRIE, supra note 52, at 277; MELTON, supra note 52, at 207.
61.

See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL

AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 48 (2d ed. 2000).
62.

MELTON, supra note 52, at 232.

63. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 52, at 281 (referring to "Blount's case... [a]s commonly
cited to have established" the "proposition" that "members of Congress are not 'officers of the
United States.'" (citations omitted)).
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impeachable, 64 Blount's acquittal stands as the first and only
precedent on the impeachability of members of Congress.
B. The Hard Cases
In this Section, I discuss three cases in which it is difficult, if
not impossible, to claim non-judicial activities as precedents. These
cases illustrate the problems with discovering precedents when there
are deficient historical records, conflicting precedents, or no
supporting network of citations.
1. Presidential Censure: The Problem of Incomplete or
Conflicting Records
Censure-a resolution condemning presidential conduct by the
House or Senate-is typical of non-judicial activities that are hard to
characterize as precedents because of three problems with the
historical record. First, the Senate expunged the only resolution that
it has formally characterized as the censure of a President. In 1834,
President Jackson instructed Acting Treasury Secretary Roger Taney
to remove deposits from the National Bank and place them in state
banks. 65 Jackson believed the National Bank was corrupt and antidemocratic, while his critics, led by Henry Clay in the Senate, believed
that the order was illegal. 66 In response to Jackson's refusal to share
with the Senate a copy of a message that he had read to his cabinet on
the subject, Clay proposed a formal resolution censuring Jackson for
assuming power not conferred by the Constitution. 67 After a ten-week
debate, the Senate approved the resolution by a vote of 26-20.68
Jackson responded publicly in two formal protests that questioned the
constitutionality of the censure resolution, but which the Senate
refused to allow into the Congressional Record. 69 Two years later, after
64. Blount's lawyers argued that expulsion was the exclusive remedy for sanctioning the
misconduct of members of Congress and that it was absurd to construe the Constitution as
allowing two modes for removing senators, particularly since expulsion is easier to accomplish
than removal, as the former depends only on the Senate's judgment. Id. at 279-80. In response,
the House Managers stressed that the two procedures were not in tension with each other,
because the impeachment process allows for one sanction that expulsion does notdisqualification. Id. While this latter argument is reasonable, neither representatives nor
senators have shown any interest in revisiting the impeachability of members of Congress.
65. See WILENTZ, supranote 31, at 394-95.
66. See id. at 392-95, 398.
67. Id. at 398-99.
68. PETERSON, supra note 12, at 14.
69. Andrew Jackson, U.S. President, Message of Protest to Senate (Apr. 15, 1834), in 3 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 69-93 (James D.
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Jackson had succeeded in helping to elect a slim Democratic majority
in the Senate, the Senate expunged the resolution pursuant to a
motion by Senator Thomas Hart Benton. 70 Thus, it is difficult to claim
a specific precedent clearly supporting the constitutionality of
presidential censure resolutions. The Senate formally repudiated the
only possible precedent for censure and arguably reinforced this
71
judgment by later refusing to censure President Clinton.
The second problem with establishing a precedent for
censuring Presidents is the fact that resolutions criticizing Presidents
and other public figures have not been called censures. The House and
Senate both have passed resolutions critical of Presidents and other
public figures, 72 but none of these has been entitled formally, then or
since, a censure resolution. On the one hand, the discovery of these
resolutions may mean that they are non-judicial precedents even
though we lack, at least as of yet, consensus for denominating them as
such. On the other hand, the failure of these resolutions to
characterize themselves as censures may be construed as additional
precedents against censure. Whatever we may call them, they are, at
least technically, not censure resolutions.
Third, establishing a precedent on censure is hard because of
the significant gaps in the historical record. Even if we were to treat
resolutions critical of Presidents and other public figures as censure
resolutions, finding such resolutions is difficult. While the Annals of
Congress (1789-1824) and its successor volume, the Register of
Debates (1824-1837), provide abstracts of congressional debates, the
editors included only the abstracts of debates that they considered
"important."73 The Congressional Globe (1833-1873) initially contained
a condensed report, rather than a verbatim report of the debates and
transcription, but Congress voted in 1873 to replace the Globe with
the Congressional Record, an in-house publication that continues to
Richardson ed., 1897); Andrew Jackson, U.S. President, Message to the Senate Clarifying the
Protest (Apr. 21, 1834), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS,

1789-1897, supra, at 93-94.
70. WILENTZ, supra note 31, at 454.
71. See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of Censure, 33 U. RICH. L. REV.
33 (1999) (discussing the constitutionality of the proposed censure of President Clinton and other
arguably similar resolutions in the past).
72. See generally Jack Maskell, Censure of the President by the Congress (Cong. Res. Serv.
98-843A 1998) (reviewing House and Senate resolutions critical of presidents); Comm. on Fed.
Legislation, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Alternatives to Impeachment: What May
Congress Do?, Dec. 11, 1998, available at http://www.nycbar.org[Publications/reports
/show html.php?rid=34 (identifying as constitutionally significant resolutions passed by the
House criticizing Presidents Tyler, Polk, Lincoln, Buchanan, and T. Roosevelt).
73. See Mildred L. Amer, The CongressionalRecord: Content, History, and Issues, 3 Cong.
Res. Serv. 93-60, (1993).
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provide the most comprehensive record of congressional activities. 74 A
1989 report to the National Archives describes the pre-1873
difficulties with congressional records:
The Constitution stipulates in Article I, section 5, that
Congress simply maintain a journal of its proceedings. Production of
an accurate record of the actual speeches and debates developed
slowly. In part, this was due to congressional traditions. All Senate
proceedings held from 1789 to 1795, for example, were closed to the
public. Senate proceedings on its executive business (treaties and
nominations) also were closed to the public until the 1920s. House
deliberations, on the other hand, always have been open to the public,
except on rare occasions. Because of the poor quality of early
transcriptions, legislators insisted on the right to edit their remarks.
Members of Congress also have been permitted to submit materials
that they did not actually read on the floor for incorporation into the
75
record.
External events, such as the 1814 British invasion of
Washington, D.C., destroyed earlier House records. Senate records
from the same period also have not survived, but for different
reasons. 76 Before 1946, it was unclear whether Senate rules required
the records of special and select committees, as well as the records of
subcommittees, to be returned to Congress at the end of the session. 77
Moreover, a combination of unsuitable storage conditions, loss of
records, and other administrative issues finally led Congress to pass
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,78 which required House
and Senate committees to maintain, for the first time, a continuous
record of all committee proceedings. 79 This Act also required that a
legislator's committee staff and personal staff remain separate to
reduce the possibility of mixing committee records with personal
papers.80 Before the Act, a legislative file might have included
published items such as bills and resolutions. While the deficiencies of

74.

See id.

75. CHARLES F. SCHAMEL ET AL., U.S. NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., GUIDE TO THE
RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 17891989: BICENTENNIAL EDITION, H.R. DOC. NO. 100-245, at 15 (1989).

76. Id. at 3.
77. Id.
78. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
79. SCHAMEL ET AL., supra note 75, at 3.
80. See 2 U.S.C. § 72(a) (2006) ("[P]rofessional staff members shall not engage in any work
other than committee business and no other duties may be assigned to them .... "); id. § 72(d)
("All committee hearings, records, data, charts, and files shall be kept separate and distinct from
the congressional office records of the Member serving as chairman of the committee .... ").
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congressional records prior to 1946 are not unique to censure,8 1 they
ought to sensitize us to the possibilities that actual citations or efforts
to transform certain activities into precedents may never have been
recorded or may have been left out of the official records.
2. Majority Rule in the Senate
From 2002 through 2005, many Republican senators
maintained that majority rule in the Senate is a fixed constitutional
principle. They claimed that Senate Rule XXII,8 2 which requires a twothirds vote to invoke cloture-to end filibusters-on motions to amend
Senate rules, is unconstitutional because the rule bars a simple
majority from exercising its constitutional entitlement to change
Senate rules as it sees fit.8 3 They argued that the rule
unconstitutionally allows past Senate majorities to prevent current or
future ones from changing Rule XXII as they prefer.8 4 The Senate
Majority Leader and other leading Republicans endorsed a plan-the
''constitutional option," sometimes referred to as the "nuclear
option"-through which a simple majority in the Senate could engage
in a series of procedural maneuvers to prevent filibusters on judicial
nominees.8 5 Although the plan was put on hold in the 1 09th Congress

81. Before 1934, presidential and executive branch records had serious deficiencies. In the
early 1900s, the State Department implemented, for the first time, a numbering system to record
executive orders, beginning with President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. From 1934
onward, the Federal Register has published presidential proclamations and executive orders. In
1935, Congress enacted the Federal Register Act, which requires, inter alia, the preservation of
administrative rules and regulations. Federal Register Act, Pub. L. No. 74-220, 49 Stat. 500
(codified as amended in 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501-11 (2006)). In 1957, the Office of the Federal Register
began publishing materials that presidents and other executive officials donated as historical
materials to the National Archives, but it was not until the Presidential Records Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-591, 92 Stat. 2523-27 (codified as amended in 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-07 (2006)) that
Congress made presidents' papers the official property of the United States.
82. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 110-9, R. XXII § 2, at 15-16 (2007).
83. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 240
(1997) (explaining various textual arguments that support this view, for example, that "the
Constitution's listing of seven instances where a two-thirds vote is required is seen as
establishing that a simple majority is generally sufficient for action by a House of Congress").
84. See, e.g., id. at 245-48 (arguing that "Rule XXII greatly limits the ability of future
Senates to change current rules," and that such a limitation is unconstitutional). But cf. John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionalityof Legislative Supermajority Voting
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 496-500 (1995) (countering that the "three-fifths
rule can be temporarily waived or permanently repealed at any time" by a simple majority of the
current Senate).
85. See generally THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How
CONGRESS IS FAILING AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 162-69 (2006) (describing how the
nuclear option works); Martin B. Gold & Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option to Change
Senate Rules and Procedures:A MajoritarianMeans to Overcome the Filibuster,28 HARV. J.L. &
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as a result of an agreement between seven Republican and seven
Democratic senators,8 6 a majority someday still could choose to deploy
it to block a minority's filibuster of a judicial nominee.
There are, however, several impediments to claiming a
precedent establishing majority rule in the Senate as a fixed
constitutional principle. Even the two Senate staffers who coined the
"constitutional option" as the name of their plan based it on a peculiar
construction of the Senate rules rather than as a constitutional
directive.8 7 Similarly, in the Senate Rules Committee hearing on the
"constitutional option", every witness, including all three Republican
experts, conceded that the constitutional option was unprecedented.8 8
Furthermore, there are several easily discoverable precedents
flatly rejecting majority rule as a fixed constitutional principle in the
Senate. In 1925, Vice President Charles Dawes, on his first day in
office, invited a majority of the Senate to bypass Senate rules to
amend the rules as they saw fit, but more than eighty percent of the
senators polled rejected his invitation.8 9 In 1957, Vice President
Richard Nixon declared that "he believed the Senate could adopt new
rules 'under
whatever procedures the majority of the Senate
approves.' "90 After Nixon urged the Senate to determine for itself Rule
XXII's constitutionality, the Senate proceeded to ignore Nixon's
statement and adhere to the requirements in Rule XXII for changing
the rules. Though in 1961 Nixon reiterated his belief in majority rule
in the Senate, the Senate again took no action to vindicate his point.
In 1967, Senator George McGovern proposed a resolution to
require only a three-fifths vote of the Senate to invoke cloture.
McGovern proposed ending debate on a motion to consider his

PUB. POL'Y 205 (2004) (describing the "constitutional option" for a majority's successfully
prohibiting judicial filibusters).
86. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supranote 85, at 168 (explaining how the so-called "Gang of 14
pulled the Senate back from the brink" by brokering an informal agreement "to oppose both the
nuclear option and filibusters on judicial confirmations").
87. Cf. id. at 166 (noting that Senate rules guru Martin Gold framed the case for the
constitutional option by arguing for its consistency with Senate precedents).
88. See Hearing on Rule XXII and Proposals to Amend the Rule Before the S. Comm. on
Rules and Administration, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2003
/060503_hearing.htm.
89. See Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Floor Statement: Jumping Off the Precipice: The "Nuclear
Option" and the United States Senate, Apr. 27, 2005, available at http://biden.senate.gov/
newsroomdetails.cfm?id=237030 (discussing the significance of the senators' rejection of Dawes'
suggestion).
90. For the pertinent text discussing Rule XXII, see STAFF OF S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN.,
99TH CONG., SENATE CLOTURE RULE: LIMITATION OF DEBATE IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF RULE XXII OF THE STANDING RULES OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE (CLOTURE RULE) 24-28 (Comm. Print 1985).
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proposed resolution and suggested-contrary to the rules-that only a
majority was needed. Some senators construed his request as asking
that proposals to amend Rule XXII be subject to a majority vote to
invoke cloture. Vice President Hubert Humphrey refused to comment
on McGovern's request. Instead, he relied on precedent allowing the
Senate, rather than the Vice President, to decide constitutional
questions. The Senate then voted 61-37 to reject McGovern's proposal
for ending debate and voted 59-37 to sustain a point of order raised by
Senator Everett Dirksen, who had challenged the constitutionality of
McGovern's motion that only a majority was needed to end Senate
debate. These votes may be construed as determinations that
McGovern's proposal was unconstitutional.
The Senate again debated the constitutionality of Rule XXII in
1969. In the course of the debate, Senator Frank Church asked the
Chair, Vice President Humphrey, whether a majority had the power to
invoke cloture, contrary to the rules of the Senate. Humphrey
answered in the affirmative and then explained that
if a majority of the Senators present and voting but fewer than two-thirds vote [as
required by the rule] in favor of the pending motion for cloture, the Chair will announce
that a majority having agreed to limit the debate [on the resolution under
consideration,] to amend XXII, at the opening
of a new Congress, debate will proceed
91
under the cloture provisions of that rule.

Humphrey acknowledged this ruling was subject to appeal to the full
body without debate. 92 The Senate initially voted 51-47 to invoke
9
cloture, after which Humphrey invoked it.
3 But the Senate
immediately voted to reverse Humphrey's ruling by a 53-45 roll call
94
vote, thereby requiring the Senate to revert to its two-thirds rule.
In 1975, the incident arose which at least some proponents of
the "constitutional option" cite as the most pertinent authority.
Senator Walter Mondale proposed to amend Rule XXII to require only
a three-fifths vote to invoke cloture. 95 During the debate over the
motion, he asked whether a majority of the Senate may "change the
'96
rules of the Senate, uninhibited by the past rules of the Senate?
Vice President Nelson Rockefeller refused to answer the question,
97
submitting it instead to the full Senate's consideration.
Subsequently, Senator James Pearson made a motion to consider
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

91 CONG. REC. 593 (1969) (statement of Vice President Humphrey).
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 90, at 29.
Gold & Gupta, supranote 85, at 251 (citing 91 CONG. REC. at 994).
Id. at 252 (citing 91 CONG. REC. at 995).
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 90, at 30.
121 CONG. REc. 758 (1975).
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., supra note 90, at 31.
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Mondale's proposal and suggested that a majority vote was sufficient
to invoke cloture. 98 Senator Mike Mansfield claimed that Pierson's
motion was out of order, but the Senate rejected Mansfield's point of
order 51-42, arguably signaling to some senators approval of
Mondale's claim that a majority vote was sufficient to invoke cloture. 99
This latter vote is treated by proponents of the "constitutional option"
as supportive precedent, even though two weeks later the Senate
voted 53-38 to reconsider what it had done and voted 53-43 to sustain
Mansfield's point of order that a majority lacked the authority to
bypass the rules to amend Rule XXII.' 00 Through the latter two votes,
the Senate "erased the [only] precedent of majority cloture established
two weeks before, and reaffirmed the [Senate] rules."101 Subsequently,
the Senate agreed to a compromise proposed by Senator Robert Byrd,
voting 73-21 on March 7, 1975, to end debate on Mondale's proposal to
amend Rule XXII, and formally amended Rule XXII by a vote of 56-27
(pursuant to Rule XXII, which allows a simple majority to amend the
rules after a vote to invoke cloture) to require a three-fifths vote to
02
invoke cloture.
Historical practices further undermine the claim of majority
rule as a fixed constitutional principle. The Senate's longstanding
traditions and rules include several counter-majoritarian measures,
including unanimous consent requirements, holds, and filibusters.
Nevertheless, in 2005, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist suggested
that there had been a Senate tradition of having up-or-down votes on
judicial nominations.10 3 The assertion is counter-factual: As Thomas
Mann and Norman Ornstein observe, "For more than two hundred
years, hundreds of judicial nominees at all levels had their
nominations buried, killed, or asphyxiated by the Senate, either by
one individual, a committee, or small group of senators, before the
nominations got anywhere near the floor."' 0 4 Senator Frist could argue
that judicial filibusters were unprecedented only by both ignoring the
98. Id. at 30.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 31-32.
103. See Bill Frist, It's Time for an Up-or-Down Vote, USA TODAY, May 16, 2005, at 12A
("[T]he Senate has always followed a careful and deliberate process of examining the nominees
through hearings, discussing their merits in committee, debating them in the full Senate and
then coming to an up-or-down vote on the Senate floor.").
104. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 85, at 167-68 (referring to holds, the blue-slip process,
the discretion of committee chairs not to schedule committee votes, and negative committee votes
as the various means through which differently sized minorities nullify judicial nominations and
other legislative business in the Senate).
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relevance of the numerous judicial nominations defeated by means
other than formal floor votes in the Senate and trying to revise the
meaning or significance of the easily discoverable filibuster that forced
the withdrawal of President Lyndon Johnson's nomination of Abe
10 5
Fortas as Chief Justice.
The final problem with establishing a precedent for majority
rule as a fixed constitutional principle is that it is easy to distinguish
the four precedents that are most commonly cited in its support. These
precedents involve Senator Robert Byrd's successful efforts to secure
majority votes to (1) end post-cloture filibustering, (2) limit
amendments to appropriation bills, (3) require nominations rather
than treaties as the first piece of business in executive sessions, and
(4) alter voting sequences on some measures. 10 6 While some
proponents of the "constitutional option" cite these as precedents of
majorities amending rules, 10 7 neither the Parliamentarian nor the
Congressional Research Service, nor anyone other than the losing
minority in Senate debates over the constitutionality of Rule XXII,
construe them as such. The failure of a Senate majority ever to cite (or
even to rely on) them in support of a fixed constitutional principle of
majority rule in the Senate undermines their authority. Instead, these
precedents signify the enforcement, rather than the formal
amendment, of Senate rules.
3. Presidential Reliance on Treaty Authorizations to
Use Military Force
Whereas establishing majority rule in the Senate as a
precedent depends on assigning dubious meaning to otherwise
discoverable precedents, there is no discoverable precedent supporting
treaty authorizations for Presidents to wage war. In this case, the
problem is determining the significance of a non-event-the Senate's
failure to ratify treaties with such authorizations.
The fact that the Senate never has ratified a treaty authorizing
a President to use force could be construed as a precedent against the
constitutionality of any such authorization. Indeed, one easily

105. See id. at 251 n.14 ("Proponents of the nuclear option argued that Fortas had not been
filibustered, even though virtually every news account at the time and the comments of Fortas
opponents viewed the actions against him as a filibuster. Moreover, the official Senate Web site,
in its section on history, has as its headline 'October 1, 1968: Filibuster Derails Supreme Court
Appointee.' ").
106. See generally Gold & Gupta, supra note 85, at 262-69 (describing the "Byrd"
precedents).
107. Id.
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discoverable precedent apparently makes this point. The Senate
rejected membership in the League of Nations in part because of
senators' fears that it would have allowed this country to go to war
without congressional authorization and would have subjected U.S.
forces to the control of foreign leaders.10 8 But treaties to which the
United States is a party usually contain no such authorizations. For
instance, the North American Treaty's provision states only that an
armed attack on any member "shall be considered an attack against
them all," and "each party will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
'
by taking forthwith ... such action as it deems necessary. "109
Moreover, there appear to be structural limitations on the treaty
power, such as the Federal Constitution's Origination Clause
requirement that the House alone has the power to initiate
0
appropriations. 11
The Senate's persistent failure to endorse certain outcomes is
not necessarily a discoverable precedent. Whereas consistent,
longstanding construction of Blount's impeachment clearly rules out
impeaching members of Congress, national political leaders and some
scholars have not ruled out the constitutionality of a treaty
authorization of a President's use of military force."' First, some may
argue that, while there may not be any precedents authorizing such
treaties, there are no precedents disallowing them. Second, because
there are no subject matter limitations on the treaty power, it may be
112
used to expand the powers that the Congress or the President enjoy.

108. See generally SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

880-82 (1965) (explaining that many senators probably would have voted for U.S. membership in
the League of Nations had there been reservations added to it declaring that American armed
forces would not be obligated to intervene "to preserve every new boundary set up under the
Treaty of Versailles").
109. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. But the
United Nations Security Council has the power under the United Nations Charter (to which the
United States is a party via a statute) to move UN members into a state of hostilities with
malefactor nations. Although President George H.W. Bush cited the UN Security Council's
authorization as the basis for his mobilization of American troops in response to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, he agreed in the eleventh hour to seek-and he received-congressional approval for
the use of force in what ensued as Desert Storm.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
111. See, e.g., Philip C. Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and
Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364,
1393-94 (1994) (pointing out that "[a]nother route to war is by treaty, because treaties have, by
virtue of Article VI, the same legal force as statutes").
112. Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867,
1869 (2005) (arguing against the declaration that "there are no subject-matter limitations on the
treaty power" in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES, in part because it allows treaties to expand congressional powers beyond those explicitly
recognized in the Constitution).
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Third, some people may argue that the federal government can use its
treaty power to do at least as much as, if not more than, it is allowed
to do through ordinary lawmaking. After all, the Supremacy Clause" 13
seems to suggest that treaties generally are (but only laws in
accordance with the Constitution are) "the supreme law of the land"
and thus that the federal government has even more extensive
authority under the treaty power than it does through ordinary
lawmaking. If Congress may authorize presidential use of force
through ordinary statutes, then it may do at least as much through its
treaty power. But, the question of the constitutionality of such treaties
is not answered by the Supremacy Clause. 114 To be sure, courts are
unlikely to review this question. 115 Once the Senate ratifies a treaty,
the matter of its constitutionality effectively is left to the President
and Senate acting concurrently, which provides the strongest
constitutional foundation for Presidents to authorize military force
(according to Justice Robert Jackson's popular framework for
separation-of-powers analysis). 1 6 And while there may be easier ways
than treaties (which require at least two-thirds of the Senate for
ratification) for Presidents to secure authorization to go to war," 7
Presidents have no incentive to rule out treaties as viable options in
the future.
Yet, all discoverable events on point support rejecting treaty
authorizations of presidential use of force. Without any precedent
directly supporting the constitutionality of such authorizations, much
less any subsequent reliance on, or citation to, such a precedent, there
is no network of supportive citation. The absence of a precedent on
point is not incontrovertible proof of the unconstitutionality of treaty
authorizations of military force, and it is still possible to find support
for them in other sources of constitutional argumentation, such as text
or original meaning. However, precedent provides no authority for
allowing treaties to sanction presidential use of force through treaties.

113. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
114. See, e.g., Bobbitt, supra note 58, at 1394.
115. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (four justices maintaining that
presidential rescission of treaties is a non-justiciable, political question, with Justice Powell
arguing that the claim was not yet ripe for judicial review because Congress had taken no action
to assert its constitutional authority).
116. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
117. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur
....,1).
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II. THE NOTABLE FEATURES OF NON-JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
In this Part, I develop an extensive taxonomy for non-judicial
precedents. I classify them by features distinguishing them from each
other and from judicial precedents.
A. The Extensiveness of Non-JudicialPrecedents
The first distinctive feature of non-judicial precedents is their
extensive variety. They may be categorized on the basis of the actors
producing them, their substantive content, or the powers deployed to
create them.
1. The Extensive Variety of Non-Judicial Actors
One way to measure the range of non-judicial precedents is by
the range of actors making them. As Philip Bobbitt observes, "there
are as many kinds of precedent as there are constitutional institutions
creating them." 118 Some of these institutions, including Congress and
Presidents, are familiar, while others, like cabinet officials or the
heads of federal agencies, may be less so. Moreover, there are state
and local officials, including governors, state legislatures, and mayors,
who have the power to make precedents.
The American public has the power to make precedents
through their interactions with public leaders. Constitution-making is
one example. While the Framers drafted the Constitution behind
closed doors, 119 the ratification process was a public event with many
formal and informal participants.1 20 The processes by which our
Constitution and state constitutions have been made and amended
may serve as precedents in the course of the public's efforts to fashion
new constitutional protections at the federal or state levels or abroad.
Popular elections are important means through which political leaders
interact with the public to ratify constitutional agendas, as Franklin

118. Bobbitt, supra note 111, at 1383.
119. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 22-23 (1966) (explaining that some
delegates criticized the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention, but also noting that, at the
time, "[s]ecrecy in legislative assemblies" was the norm).
120. See MICHAEL A. GILLESPIE & MICHAEL LIENESCH, RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 1

(Michael A. Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989) (explaining that the ratification process
involved "more than seventeen hundred delegates, chosen in town meetings and local elections
by tens of thousands of voters throughout the land," and that noting that the deliberations of
these delegates took place not behind closed doors, but "in churches and taverns, in letters to the
editor and newspaper columns, in whispered conversations and noisy stump speeches," as well).
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Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan, and Richard Nixon each did in seeking
public approval of their pledges to transform the courts. 121 How these
Presidents achieved their agendas-Roosevelt to make the Court more
supportive of the constitutionality of the New Deal, Nixon to appoint
"strict constructionists," and Reagan to curtail liberal judicial
activism-creates potential precedents for future Presidents to
emulate. Moreover, legal scholars, civil rights and other organized
interest groups, and the American Bar Association may create
precedents of their own. For instance, the American Bar Association
evaluates judicial nominees and proposed legislation 122 and the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law in comments on
nominations, sponsors and coordinates litigation, and lobbies for civil
123
rights legislation.
2. The Different Kinds of Constitutional Judgments
Non-judicial precedents may be categorized on the basis of
their substantive content. First, there are non-judicial precedents with
purely constitutional content. These precedents are decisions in which
non-judicial authorities directly address constitutional questions. For
example, non-judicial precedent apparently guided the National
Archivist in resolving the legality of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment. 124 The Amendment was first proposed in 1791, but an
insufficient number of states voted to ratify it by the end of the First
Congress.1 25 Without any time limit or deadline for ratification
imposed by Congress, it was unclear whether states joining the union
after the Amendment was proposed were precluded from voting on its
ratification.1 26 By 1992, thirty-eight states had ratified the

121. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL

AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 130-31 (rev. ed. 2003).
122. See generally THE ABA IN LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY: WHAT ROLE? (1994) (exploring the
role the ABA has played with regard to legislation on various national issues and also with
regard to judicial nominations).
123. See, e.g., Press Release, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Urges Rejection of John D. Ashcroft as Attorney General
of the United States (Jan. 22, 2001), available at http://lawyerscommittee.org/2005website/
publications/press/press01801.html.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. See Richard B. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History
and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 532-33 (1992)
(explaining that the test that National Archivist Don W. Wilson used to determine whether to
certify the Amendment was "whether the state certificates of ratification meet the requirements
of Article V and whether the certificates set forth congruent texts of the amendment").
125. See Bernstein, supranote 124, at 532-33.
126. See id. at 537-38, 542-51.
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amendment.127 Following precedent, the National Archivist deferred to
states' decisions and certified the Amendment's adoption, 128 and
Congress declared the Amendment valid by joint resolution. 129
Second, non-judicial precedents may consist of mixtures of
constitutional and policy judgments. One example is the Senate's
rejection of President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. The Senate
Judiciary Committee declared the plan "unconstitutional" and
concluded that "[i]ts practical operation would be to make the
Constitution what the executive or legislative branches of the
government choose to say it is-an interpretation to be changed with
'1 30
each change of the administration."
Third, non-judicial precedents may consist primarily of policy.
Indeed, most non-judicial activities have this kind of content. For
instance, congressional voting on legislation obviously entails making
policy choices, though it might often involve implicit judgments made
by some members about the constitutionality of the legislation on
which they are voting.
3. Categorizing on the Basis of Form or Context
Non-judicial precedents may be categorized according to their
forms or the contexts in which they are made. For example, nonjudicial precedents may consist of floor votes and rulemaking in the
House or Senate.' 31 While not all of these activities may be based
expressly on constitutional judgments, the formulations, retentions,
and attempted amendments of House or Senate rules depend on the
members' understandings of their constitutional power to undertake
these activities.
But members of Congress do not just create precedent through
formal lawmaking or rulemaking. Their inaction also may produce
precedents. Members of Congress may create precedents when they
vote against legislation they deem unconstitutional or when they vote
not to impeach or convict someone because they do not believe his
127. See U.S. Constitution Amendment 27, 57 Fed. Reg. 21,187 (May 19, 1992).
128. See With Little Fanfare, Amendment Is Signed, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at A14.
129. See Bernstein, supra note 124, at 542 (noting that Congress overwhelmingly confirmed
the Archivist's decision by a 99-0 vote in the Senate and a 414-3 vote in the House).
130. See S. REP. No. 75-711, at 13-14 (1937) (summarizing senators' explanations for their
rejection of the Court-packing plan), reprinted in LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL
DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 94-96 (1992).

131. See, e.g., Betsy Palmer, Changing Senate Rules: The "Constitutional"or "Nuclear"
Option 1 (Cong. Res. Serv., CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32684, Apr. 5, 2005)
(describing the presiding officer's and institution's formal judgments on rules and their operation
as governing "precedents" within the Senate).
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misconduct to be impeachable. Their refusals to declare war also may
create potential precedents about the legal prerequisites for such
declarations. Similarly, they may be creating precedents when they
vote against judicial nominations based on their disapproval of the
nominees' constitutional opinions.
In fact, most congressional activity occurs off of the House and
Senate floors. Legislative committees may create precedent through
what they approve or disapprove. Committees are Congress's
gatekeepers, as nothing reaches the floor of the House or Senate
without first being considered in committee. 132 Usually, a committee's
disapproval is fatal, though exceptions are made through discharge
petitions (requiring majority approval in the House and unanimous
133
consent in the Senate).
Congressional constitutional judgments also may take the
forms of informal practices, norms, and traditions. 34 Seniority has
been a longstanding, but not binding, criterion for committee
assignments in the House and Senate.1 35 The practice constitutes a
continuing exercise of each chamber's authority to "determine Rules
for its proceedings."'136 Each chamber's formal rules derive from the
same explicit constitutional authority.
Presidents and other executive officials may produce precedent
in at least as many forms as Congress does. They may create
precedents through executive orders, federal regulations, and the
official opinions and memoranda of legal counsel in every executive
department and agency. Presidents and executive officials also render
constitutional judgments through informal practices, norms, and
traditions. For instance, Presidents from Thomas Jefferson through
Woodrow Wilson delivered their States of the Union by letter, but
Wilson inaugurated what has become the customary presidential

132. See Arthur T. Denzau & Robert J. Mackay, Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of
Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated Behavior, 27 AM. J. POL. SCI. 740, 741-44
(1983) (examining the ways in which committee members can sometimes exploit their
gatekeeping' role).
133. See generally Congressional Quarterly, Guide to Congress 425 (3d ed. 1982). Discharge
petitions allow a majority of House members to bring to the floor bills that have been before a
committee for a certain period of time (thirty days, in the case of standing committees, and seven
days, in the case of the Rules Committee) without being acted on by that committee.
134. See, e.g., id. at 195-96 (discussing the "norm" of senatorial courtesy and other
longstanding practices of the Senate).
135. See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 623, 662-63 (1996) (charting the peaks and valleys of the seniority system over
the course of the twentieth century).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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practice of delivering the address before a joint session of Congress. 137
The practice has enhanced the prestige of the President by giving him
a much more visible and powerful bully pulpit from which to speaknational coverage of his special addresses to joint sessions of Congress.
The choice of delivering the State of the Union is the consequence of
Presidents' judgments about how they would like to deliver their
address and Congress's acquiescence.
State officials render constitutional judgments in at least as
many forms as federal officials do. State constitutions are the states'
most prominent constitutional judgments; they provide additional
governmental obligations and powers beyond those that the federal
Constitution requires. State law, for instance, generally sets forth the
legal definitions of life, marriage, and death. 138 Moreover, since
Massachusetts legally wed the first same-sex couple in 2004, eighteen
states have amended their state constitutions to prohibit gay
marriage. 139 These eighteen state constitutional amendments all are
based in part on lawmakers' conceptions of their constitutional
authorities over the subject. In addition, state law defines the
1 40
authority of State Attorneys General to issue legal opinions.
Because Governors usually do not appoint State Attorneys General,
these officials may disagree over constitutional issues, and thus some
states have developed special processes for resolving such
disagreements.14 1 Moreover, state legislatures create precedents
similar to those made by Congress. All state legislators make
judgments about legislation, and state constitutions set forth
procedures for removing or recalling certain officials.1 42 For instance,
137. See H.W. BRANDS, WOODROW WILSON 29-31 (2003) (describing this innovation as "one of
[Wilson's] lasting contributions to American governance").
138. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (Deering 2007) (defining "death" as either
"irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions," or "irreversible cessation of all
functions of the entire brain").
139. Anna Badkhen, In Massachusetts, Gay Weddings are Now Routine; Growing Acceptance
of Same-Sex Nuptials on FirstAnniversary, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 2005, at A4.
140. See NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN.,

STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES 61-75 (Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) (discussing nature and effect of advisory
opinions of attorneys general).
141. For instance, former Virginia governor Doug Wilder appointed special legal counsel to
represent the Virginia Retirement System because he perceived that Mary Sue Terry, the
attorney general, would have a conflict of interests. Though Terry filed suit, the state assembly
resolved the impasse under section 2.1-122(a) of the Virginia Code (current version at VA. CODE
ANN. § 2.2-510.1 (2007)), which specified that the governor may appoint special counsel when the
Attorney General's office is "unable" to render the service at issue.
142. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (regarding disqualification from office, bribery, and
improper election practices); MO. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1, 4 (regarding impeachment and removal of
officers not subject to impeachment); N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (regarding disqualifications for
office).
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in 2003 the voters of California agreed to recall (and thus remove)
then-Governor Gray Davis and to replace him with Arnold
Schwarzenegger. 143 In 2004, Connecticut Governor John Rowland
resigned when confronted with the likely prospect of his impeachment
and removal from office for misappropriating funds, 144 while New
Jersey Governor James McGreevey resigned in anticipation of an
effort to remove him based on allegations that he had sexually
145
harassed a male employee.
State law also serves as the primary basis for certain interests
protected by the Federal Constitution. In cases requiring
interpretation and application of the Contracts Clause, 146 courts need
to determine whether a contract exists before deciding whether a
particular contractual obligation has been impaired. Whether a
contract exists depends on the relevant state law.147 In cases involving
construction of the Due Process Clause 148 or the Takings Clause,1 49 the
state law to determine whether an interest qualifies as
Court consults
"property."150 Moreover, the Court at times has undertaken
determination as to whether a particular criminal sentence is

143. Charlie LeDuff, The CaliforniaRecall: The Governor-Elect;A Sudden, Decisive Victory
for a Newcomer to Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2003, at A26.
144. William Yardley, Under Pressure, Rowland Resigns Governor's Post, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2004, at Al.
145. Laura Mansnerus, McGreevey Steps Down After Disclosing a Gay Affair, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 2004, at Al.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall.., pass any... Law impairing the Obligation
").
of Contracts ....
147. See, e.g., Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (addressing the
issue of whether a particular Indiana law amounted to a contract between the State and an
individual acting on the basis of that law); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 259 (1827) ("It is,
then, the municipal law of the State, whether that be written or unwritten, which is
emphatically the law of the contract made within the State, and must govern it throughout,
wherever its performance is sought to be enforced.").
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
").
or property, without due process of law ....
149. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
150. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (noting that
state law creates the underlying substantive interest whose deprivation may violate the Due
Process Clause if the interest rises to the level of a "legitimate claim of entitlement"); Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (finding property interests to be "created and...
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law"); Fox River Paper v. R.R. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 651, 653-54 (1927) (refusing to dismiss case for
lack of jurisdiction merely because the existence of the riparian right for which plaintiffs in error
sought constitutional protection depended upon state law); Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S.
536, 548 (1907) (declining to find a Takings Clause violation where New York law did not
support plaintiffs holding an easement that could have been deprived of him in the first place).
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"unusual" in violation of the Eighth Amendment 51 by measuring its
consistency with state punishment schemes. 152 In substantive due
process cases, the Court often has deferred to state practices as
establishing a benchmark in the form of tradition against which to
measure the legality of a particular action. In Lawrence v. Texas, the
majority found "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex." 153 The Court found no tradition or
"longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual
conduct as a distinct matter"'154 and thus overruled Bowers v.
Hardwick, which mistakenly had identified a tradition supporting the
criminalization of homosexual activity. 155
The public's expression of constitutional judgments also may
have the potential to become precedent. Direct democracy implements
popular sovereignty, and popular sovereignty is a major theme and
influence in our constitutional development. 56
In addition, the efforts of non-judicial authorities to fortify
judicial precedents constitute another set of non-judicial precedents.
While judicial decisions helped the civil rights movement flourish,
they did so with the aid of significant presidential and congressional
activities, 157 such
as President
Truman's
executive
order
desegregating the military and the passage of the 1958 and 1964 Civil
Rights Acts. 5 8 Furthermore, the civil rights movement, particularly
the cohesive litigation strategy to end state-mandated segregation, is
the model for contemporary interest groups to advance their agendas

151. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
152. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003) (undertaking interjurisdictional
analysis with respect to "three strikes" laws). But see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)
(undertaking no such comparative analysis).
153. 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
154. Id. at 568.
155. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570-71.
156. See generally LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing that the American people bear ultimate responsibility for
the interpretation and implementation of the American Constitution).
157. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (concluding that intervention by the

federal government facilitated a fundamental shift in the racial attitudes and practices of U.S.
society).
158. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Civil Rights Act of
1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
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through litigation over such diverse issues as gay marriage, abortion
I 59
rights, and church-state relations.
4. Congressional and Presidential Authorities
Non-judicial precedents may be categorized on the basis of the
powers producing them. For instance, the Constitution explicitly vests
Congress with seventy-five powers, Presidents with fourteen, and Vice
Presidents with five. The exercise of each of these powers has the
potential to become a precedent. For instance, pursuant to express
authority set forth in Article I, the House of Representatives has
excluded five people from being seated because of their failures to
satisfy the requirements for membership in the House, 160 expelled four
members, 161 censured twenty-two members for misconduct, 162 and
reprimanded eight members for misconduct. 63 The Senate has
65
excluded six people from being seated, 164 expelled fifteen members,
and censured nine members. 66 Although these legislative acts are
ignored in the study of precedent, they serve as precedents on the
problem of how to handle the misconduct of members of the House and
Senate.
Presidents also may create precedents through the exercise of
their official powers. For instance, President Andrew Jackson's veto of
the Second National Bank is one of the most famous statements and
precedents bolstering the proposition that the "opinion of the judges
has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has

159. See

MARK V. TUSHNET,

THE NAACP's

LEGAL STRATEGY

AGAINST SEGREGATED

EDUCATION, 1925-1950, at 144 (1987) (describing a common perception of the NAACP's litigation
campaign as a model for public interest law generally).
160. See ROBERT L. TIENKEN, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RELATING TO

EXCLUSION, EXPULSION AND CENSURE (Washington, D.C. Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, 1973). But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489-92 (1969) (overturning
exclusion of U.S. Representative Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. from the 90th Congress on grounds
that he wrongfully diverted House funds for personal use and for the use of others and made
false reports regarding expenditures of foreign currency).
161. See

JACK MASKELL,

EXPULSION,

CENSURE, REPRIMAND,

AND

FINE:

LEGISLATIVE

DISCIPLINE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 24-25 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Report for
Congress Order Code RL 31382, 2002). After pleading guilty to several felonies, and before the
House formally expelled him, Bob Ney resigned from the House on November 3, 2006. See Jack
Torry & James Nash, Ney Quits, "Seven Weeks Too Late'; Convicted Congressman Infuriates
Ohio Republicans, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 4, 2006, at Al.
162. Maskell, supra note 161, at 22-23.
163. Id. at 23-24.
164. ANNE M. BUTLER & WENDY WOLFF, UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION, EXPULSION, AND
CENSURE CASES, 1793-1990, S. DOC. No. 103-33, at xviii (1st Sess. 1995).
165. Id. at xxviii.

166. Id. at xxix.
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over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of
both.1 67 Moreover, as of October 9, 2006, Presidents have vetoed more
than 2500 federal laws-far more than the 165 struck down by the
Court.168 These vetoes may comprise an important set of precedents on
executive power.
Many other executive powers are similarly discounted, yet they
remain significant. For instance, Presidents choose how to structure
their office. 169 President Richard Nixon had only one White House
counsel-John Dean-while President George W. Bush has almost
twenty people in the White House Counsel's office. 170 Other executive
officials create precedents through the exercise of their respective
authorities. For instance, the President may ask the Attorney General
for formal advice on particular constitutional questions.1 71 This advice
is given in the form of official opinions from the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Justice Department.172
Similarly, we mistakenly discount the Vice President's
authority. On his last day in office as Vice President, Al Gore, Jr.
undertook to settle the 2000 presidential election, as "President of the
Senate,"' 73 by overseeing the final count of electoral votes for the
presidency, including opening "all the certificates" of electoral votes
cast.1 74 Gore did not have to settle any challenges to electoral votes,
but a much earlier Vice President, Thomas Jefferson, effectively
exercised this non-reviewable power to his advantage after the closely
contested presidential election of 1800.175
167. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, reprinted in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1145 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897).
168. Sanford Levinson, Poison Pen, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 9, 2006, at 12.
169. See, e.g., 1 GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 816 (Michael Nelson ed., CQ Press 3d ed. 2002)
(1989) (describing the efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in conjunction with Congress's
passage of a reorganization act, to modernize the administration of the White House).
170. See Michael A. Fletcher, Quiet but Ambitious White House Counsel Makes Life of Law,
WASH. POST, June 21, 2005, at A19 (mentioning White House Counsel Harriet Miers' staff of
thirteen lawyers); see also Dan Froomkin, 2004 White House Office Staff List, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/administration/whbriefing/2004stafflistc.html
(2004) (providing a list of paid White House staff).
171. See 2 GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENCY 1221-23 (Michael Nelson ed., CQ Press 3d ed. 2002)
(1989) (describing the changing priorities of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice
through the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations).
172. See generally Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function:The Legal Adhesive
for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 337, 337-38 (1993) (citing several "famous executive
decisions" guided by advice provided by the Office of Legal Counsel).
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3
174. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
175. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 55-69 (2005) (noting that this
constitutional provision permitted Thomas Jefferson, sitting as both Vice President of the United
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Another overlooked, but not insignificant, power is the explicit
authority within the House to "chuse their Speaker and other
Officers" 176 and the Senate to "chuse their other Officers." 177 Pursuant
to these authorizations, the chambers have chosen their leadership for
more than two hundred years. Many other implicit powers are rarely
reviewed, but when the Court has done so, it has not questioned their
exercise. For instance, the principal dispute among the Justices in
Goldwater v. Carter was not whether, but why they should avoid
adjudicating whether Presidents have the authority to rescind treaties
1 78
unilaterally.
The range of these various actors' powers says nothing about
their finality. The next Part examines the durability and finality of
the overwhelming number of non-judicial authorities' constitutional
judgments, even when they are subject to judicial review.
B. The Finality of Non-JudicialPrecedents
Judicial review of non-judicial constitutional activities is more
limited than commonly thought. In this Section, I examine how nonjudicial precedents may be distinguished based on the extent to which
they are the last words on constitutional matters.
1. The Limited Scope of Judicial Review
Anyone familiar with constitutional law knows that the Court
does not have the power to decide every constitutional issue it wants
to decide. 179 By design, the Court must wait for constitutional
questions to come before it. Indeed, the Court never has had
States and President of the Senate, to count Georgia's four electoral votes for the Republicans in
the 1800 election rather than disqualify them, despite widely publicized irregularities with
Georgia's submitted ballot and despite Jefferson's own candidacy for the U.S. Presidency at the
time).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
177. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
178. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The Court vacated the claim. Id. Four Justices based their decision
on the political question doctrine, id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), while Justice Powell
concurred on the grounds that the claim was not yet ripe for judicial review because Congress
had taken no action to assert its constitutional authority, id. at 996-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 807 (2d ed. 2005) ("[The
Executive has adhered to a constitutional view... that the President has unreviewable
authority (a) to determine when the interests of the United States demand U.S. military action
and (b) to commit our troops to the protection of U.S. interests, even without clear legislative
authority.").
179. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 18

(1976) (noting the limitation that the courts may only decide constitutional issues as questions of
law "in the course of ordinary litigation").
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jurisdiction to hear all possible constitutional claims. 180 Nor are all
constitutional questions litigated, and of the constitutional questions
18 1 Of
that are litigated, not all are appealed to the Supreme Court.
those that are appealed, the Court chooses not to hear all of them. Of
the questions that the Court chooses to decide, not all are
constitutional cases,1 8 2 and most constitutional cases involve the
constitutional judgments of non-judicial authorities. Hence, virtually
every question of constitutional law that the Court hears already has
been considered by one or more non-judicial actors. It is thus an
exaggeration to assume that judicial review makes the Court supreme
in fashioning constitutional law.
In fact, most constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors
survive judicial review.18 3 First, the Court may not take cases in which
lower courts have upheld non-judicial constitutional activity. For
much of its history, the Court had jurisdiction to review lower state
court decisions overturning federal laws or rights, but it could not
review state court decisions upholding such laws or rights. 18 4 Second,
in most constitutional cases, the Court uses extremely deferential
review. Judicial review primarily involves the application of the
180. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 320-21 (5th ed. 2003) (noting the absence of Supreme Court
jurisdiction over state court decisions of federal questions approving a claim of federal right, and
over state court decisions on the basis of diversity of citizenship).
181. For the twelve month period ending on March 31, 2004, 1,654,847 cases were filed in
the bankruptcy courts, Statistics Div., Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Federal
Judicial Caseload Statistics, at Table F (Mar. 31, 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/
tables/FOOmarO5.pdf; 255,851 civil cases were filed in the U.S. District Courts, id. at Table C,
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/C00mar05.pdf; and 60,505 cases were filed in the
U.S Court of Appeals, id. at Table B, http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2005/tables/B00mar05.pdf.
During the 2004 term, the Supreme Court considered 1,727 petitions from the appellate docket,
granting certiorari to sixty-nine, and 5,815 petitions from the miscellaneous docket, granting
certiorari to only eleven. See The Supreme Court-The 2004 Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 415, 426 (2005).
182. See Jonathan D. Glater, As a Private Lawyer, Miers Left Little for the Public Record,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2005, at A17 (citing statistics that of eighty cases before the Supreme Court
in the 2004-2005 term, only thirty-three raised questions of constitutional law, and that such
numbers are typical).
183. For instance, I found that in its 2004 term the Supreme Court had three cases involving
constitutional judgments of the federal government outside the criminal context. Of these cases,
the Court decided at least two in favor of the government. Likewise, I found in that term thirteen
cases involving the constitutional judgments of state or local actors. Of these thirteen cases, the
Court decided nine in favor of the government's positions. Note, however, that this ratio shifts in
the criminal context-of the three federal criminal cases involving constitutional issues, all were
decided against the government, while six of eight state criminal cases involving constitutional
issues were decided against the government.
184. FALLON, JR., ET AL., supra note 180, at 320-21 (noting that state court decisions
"favorable to federal claims were ... excluded from the Court's appellate jurisdiction" from 1789
to 1914).
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rational basis test-the most deferential standard available for
assessing the constitutionality of governmental action.18 5 It is rare for
the Court to strike down governmental action for lack of a rational
86
basis.'
Third, the standing and political question doctrines have
precluded judicial review of several areas of constitutional law. The
standing doctrine restricts who may litigate certain constitutional
claims in Article III courts. 8 7 For instance, the Court decided not to
address the constitutionality of public schools' daily recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance. 8 8 By overturning on standing grounds a Ninth
Circuit holding that the Pledge violated the First Amendment's
prohibition against establishment of religion,1 8 9 the Court left intact
the words "under God," which Congress had inserted into the Pledge
at the outset of the Cold War. 190 When a district court subsequently
ruled that Ninth Circuit precedent required overturning the Pledge on
Establishment Clause grounds, members of Congress wasted no time
in denouncing the decision and ratifying their earlier decision to
include the words "under God" in the Pledge. 19 1 Furthermore, the
Court avoids reaching the merits of several matters involving the
92
powers of non-judicial actors through the political question doctrine.

185. See BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1290 ("Rational basis is the most
deferential of the standards of review that courts use ....
").
186. For notable exceptions, see, for example, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(invalidating a Texas statute criminalizing certain intimate sexual conduct between two persons
of the same sex on due process grounds for failing to further any legitimate state interest that
could justify its intrusion on the privacy of the individual); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624,
632 (1996) (holding as unconstitutional under equal protection an amendment to the Colorado
state constitution prohibiting "all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or
local government" designed to protect homosexual persons on the grounds that it "lack[ed] a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 435, 450 (1985) (holding that Texas's denial of a special use permit for operation of a
group home for the mentally retarded reflected an "irrational prejudice" against the mentally
retarded that violated equal protection).
187. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 58 (4th ed. 2003) ('The notion is that

by restricting who may sue in federal court, standing limits what matters the judiciary will
address and minimizes judicial review of the actions of the other branches of government.").
188. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5, 17-18 (2004).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...").
190. Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 396, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
191. See 148 CONG. REC. S6101-02, S6104 (2002) (quoting various Senators, referring to the
decision as "twisted" (statement of Sen. Lieberman), "nuts" (statement of Sen. Daschle), and
"stupid" (statement of Sen. Reid)).
192. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226-27, 234 (1993) (declining to exercise
judicial review of the Senate's chosen method for trying a federal judge on impeachment
charges); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450, 456 (1939) (leaving to Congress the decision as to
whether its proposal of a constitutional amendment had 'lost its vitality" due to the lapse of time
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The Court has held nonjusticiable challenges to the process for
ratifying constitutional amendments, 193 using Senate trial committees
to gather evidence and take testimony for judicial impeachment
195
trials, 194 and enforcing the Republican Guarantee Clause.
Fourth, the Court defers to non-judicial precedents in such
varied forms as traditions, 196 customs, 1 97 and historical1 98 and
administrative practices.1 99 Tradition oftentimes refers to states'
longstanding understandings about the scope of personal autonomy in
certain realms of behavior or their powers to restrict or proscribe
personal autonomy. 200 Historical practices usually refer to the federal
government's longstanding or past exercises of powers over certain
domains. 20 1 In Stuart v. Laird, the Court upheld the congressional
requirement that Supreme Court Justices ride circuit in a stunning
endorsement of non-judicial precedent. 20 2 As Justice William Paterson
explained for the unanimous Court,

prior to the state ratifications required to enact it); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)
(declining to give judicial effect to the provisions of an international treaty when the provisions
are not self-executing and Congress has not executed these provisions through the enactment of
positive law).
193. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450.
194. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229-38.
195. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 35-36, 39-40, 46-47 (1849) (declining to decide whether
the charter government of Rhode Island had been displaced by a separately constituted state
government whose constitution was adopted and ratified by a majority of Rhode Island voters).
196. Id. at 39 ("In forming the constitutions of the different States... the political
department has always determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment was
ratified or not by the people of the State ....
").
197. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109, 115 (1984) ("Custom has also been a source of decisional authority
that has been relied upon frequently by the Court.").
198. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003) (deferring to legislative history
and historical practice in upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 786-91 (1983) (discussing practices "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of
this country," but also noting that history and tradition do not vindicate constitutional
violations).
199. See supra notes 108, 117 and accompanying text (discussing treaty authorization of a
President's use of military power).
200. See, e.g., Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (referring to traditional concepts of the
right to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 725 (1997) (referring to the 'long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse
unwanted medical treatment").
201. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 (2003) (referring to the
"historical practice" of the Executive making postwar reparations settlements). In Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), the Court construed "changed circumstances" in police practices
as an additional basis for deferring to non-judicial activities-in that case, violations of the
ancient "knock-and-announce" rule. Id. at 599.
202. 5 U.S. 299, 309 (1803).
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[P]ractice and acquiescence... for a period of several years, commencing with the
organization of the judicial system, affords an irrestistible [sic] answer, and has indeed
fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature.
This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled ....
[A]nd
203
[it] ought not now to be disturbed.

Custom-institutional or cultural habits and conventions-is a
basis for decision in such diverse contexts as separation of powers,
establishment of religion, international law, 20 4 and municipal liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Administrative practices, which are the most
common federal non-judicial activities, entail agencies' constructions
of ambiguous federal statutes. 20 5 While the Court defers to these
constructions most of the time, 20 6 it is even more deferential to
historical practices, customs, and traditions, which it rarely
20 7
overturns.
Moreover, the Court allows the states to render final
judgments on the scope of their sovereign immunity. 20 8 Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that states may waive their
immunity from being forced to pay damages in federal court. 20 9 The
Court also allows states to determine the actions for which they may
be held accountable under the Fourteenth Amendment's state action
doctrine.210
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060 (listing "international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as law," as a
source of international law).
205. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1062-70 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the
commonality of agencies' constructions of ambiguous federal statutes and the Court's consistent
deference to them).
206. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 984 (1992) (finding that the Court, before 1984, deferred to agencies in 75% of surveyed
cases, but after Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
it deferred to agencies in only 59% of the cases in which it applied Chevron's framework).
207. For notable exceptions, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996)
(requiring, under the Equal Protection Clause, a traditionally male-only state military institute
to admit women); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding that prayer at a graduation
ceremony induced unwilling students to conform in violation of the Establishment Clause,
despite the long-standing tradition of such a practice); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967)
(overturning state anti-miscegenation laws as violative of Equal Protection, despite their
continued prevalence and acceptance as constitutional subsequent to the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
208. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-69 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1,
10 (1890); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728 (1883).
209. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999) ("[T]he Constitution was understood, in
light of its history and structure, to preserve the States' traditional immunity ... ").
210. See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675-76 (1999) (holding that a court will find a waiver of immunity only if the state voluntarily
invokes the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, or if it makes a "clear declaration" that it intends to
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Fifth, preoccupation with judicial review sometimes blinds
commentators to the Court's deference to non-judicial precedent. For
instance, the dissents' stridency about the majority's activism in two
recent cases deflected attention from the fact that the common link
between the cases was the Court's deference to non-judicial authority.
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court concluded that federal law
criminalizing possession and distribution of marijuana preempted
states from allowing doctors to authorize their patients to use
marijuana for medical purposes. 211 While the dissent complained that
the majority had failed to give adequate deference to the states
operating as laboratories, 2 12 the majority deferred to Congress's
213
formulation of a comprehensive national policy to regulate drugs.
Similarly, in Kelo v. City of New London, the majority upheld a
locality's decision to take private property in a relatively poor
neighborhood in order to develop the land to benefit wealthier
residents. 214 Although the dissent characterized the decision as
radically departing from precedent, 2 15 the Kelo majority recognized
that localities-non-judicial authorities-had final say about the
"public uses[s]" for which they may exercise control over private
property. 216 Localities could make more restrictive determinations of
what constitutes "public use" for purposes of eminent domain, and
such determinations would be just as constitutional as New London's
judgment (and for the same reasons). 2 17 Similarly, Raich does not
preclude Congress from changing its policy to exempt medical
2 18
marijuana from the coverage of its drug policies.
Similarly, in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, in part, on the
basis of "an unbroken congressional practice of granting to authors of
219
works with existing copyrights the benefit of term extensions."
Eldred effectively recognized that Congress had the last word on the

submit itself to Supreme Court jurisdiction); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436,
that a state's sovereign immunity "is a personal privilege which it may waive
v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1858) (holding that the decision for a state to
"is altogether voluntary on the part of the sovereignty").
211. 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
212. Id. at 43 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 33 (majority opinion).
214. 545 U.S. 469, 488-90 (2005).
215. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 476-83 (majority opinion).
217. Id.
218. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22 (concluding that Congress acted within
219. 537 U.S. 186, 200 (2003).

447 (1883) (holding
at pleasure"); Beers
waive its immunity

its authority).
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scope of its power to regulate copyrights for "limited Times." 220 The
Constitution does not compel Congress to extend repeatedly, or to stop
extending, copyright terms. A different Congress could interpret its
power differently.
Sixth, there are numerous subjects that the Court is unlikely to
subject to judicial review. For instance, the federal impeachment
process is rife with final congressional judgments on constitutional
questions, such as the appropriate burden of proof, rules of evidence,
and procedures for impeachment trials. 221 Similarly, Presidents and
senators make the final, constitutional judgments on the criteria for
assessing judicial, cabinet, and subcabinet nominations. 222 Other
areas in which non-judicial actors made effectively final decisions are
the structure or organization of presidential transitions, 223 the powers
224
of congressional committees and their respective jurisdictions,
rulemaking within the House and the Senate, 225 and the
reorganization of the federal government (such as the recent creation
of the Department of Homeland Security 226). Presidential decisions on
227
vetoes and pardons are invariably final.
Even when the Court uses heightened scrutiny, it does not
always reject the claim. 228 While the Court reviewed the
220. Id. at 193-94 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).

221. See GERHARDT, supra note 61, at 112-17 (discussing these and other constitutional
issues arising in impeachment proceedings).
222. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Appointments Process as Constitutional
Interpretation,in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 110 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington
eds., 2005) (discussing the ways in which the Senate effects unreviewable constitutional
interpretation through its authority over federal appointments).
223. See generally Jack M. Beerman & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of
PresidentialTransitions,84 N.C. L. REV. 1253 (2006).
224. See generally Keith E. Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional
Committees, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 222, at 87 (suggesting that
committees engage constitutional issues, as evidenced through their hearings).
225. Courts routinely have deferred to Congress's internal procedural rules. In United States
v. Ballin, the Court upheld a congressional procedural rule under the rational basis test. 144
U.S. 1, 5 (1892). Since Ballin, lower courts have dismissed judicial challenges to procedural rules
on standing and political question grounds. See, e.g., Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 845 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (dismissing a challenge to certain House rules for lack of standing); Hoffman v.
Jeffords, 175 F. Supp. 2d 49, 60 (D.D.C. 2001) (refusing to hear a challenge regarding a Senator's
switch of political parties based on lack of standing); Page v. Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23, 29 (D.D.C.
1998) (declining to hear a challenge to Senate procedural rules based on lack of standing).
226. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.).
227. See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974) ("Presidents throughout our history as
a Nation have exercised the power to pardon or commute sentences upon conditions that are not
specifically authorized by statute [and] such conditions have generally gone unchallenged.").
228. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the
notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' " (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
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constitutionality of the University of Michigan's law school admissions
program under strict scrutiny, it upheld the policy. 229 It adopted
Justice Lewis Powel's approach in his pivotal opinion in Regents of
University of California v. Bakke230 to uphold for the first time a racial
preference for admission to a professional school. 23 1 Similarly, while
232
the Court subjected the Bi-Partisan Campaign Finance Reform Bill
and Family Leave Act 23 3 to heightened scrutiny, it upheld both.
Indeed, the number of laws struck down by the Court is small.
It has overturned fewer than 200 federal laws, 234 which averages less
than one per year since the Court's inception. Even though the
Rehnquist Court overturned more than thirty federal laws, 235 this
number is tiny compared to the actual number of bills approved in
either the House or Senate-and thus, at least implicitly, deemed
constitutional by members of the House or Senate-during the same
period.2 3 6 Moreover, the Rehnquist Court struck down only a tiny
fraction of the constitutional activities of political authorities besides

448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)).
229. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
230. 438 U.S. 265, 314-15 (1978) (arguing, though not joined by any other members of the
Court on this part of his opinion, that race "is only one element in a range of factors a university
properly may consider").
231. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
232. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act).
233. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Family and Medical Leave Act).
234. As of the close of the 2005 term, the Supreme Court had struck down 165 federal laws
as unconstitutional. Of those, fourteen were struck down during the 1930s; thirty-seven were
struck down by the Rehnquist Court. See LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH &
THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 176-80 (4th ed. 2007) (charting
Supreme Court decisions holding Acts of Congress unconstitutional between 1789 and 2005).
235. See Neal Devins, Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders: The Majoritarian
Rehnquist Court?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 64 (2004) (noting that the Rehnquist Court
struck down thirty-one laws between 1995 and 2002).
236. From the advent of the Rehnquist Court in 1986 through its formal end in the fall of
2006, the Senate passed 11,642 total measures, while the House passed 13,257, for a grand total
of 24,899. The total number of measures passed is considerably smaller than the number of
measures introduced. In approving measures, members of the House or Senate are presumably
accepting their constitutionality. Of course, these numbers do not include the many other
measures that members opposed on constitutional grounds. See R6sum6 of Congressional
Activity, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two -columntablefResumes.htm (showing
the total number of bills introduced being significantly higher than the total number of bills
passed) (last visited Feb. 1, 2008).
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Congress. For instance, it struck down only a small number of states'
237
constitutional judgments in its last few years.
The Court overturns presidential judgments even more rarely.
Over the past half century, the Court has overturned fewer than a
dozen presidential acts, most of which involved presidential efforts to
thwart judicial inquiries into their conduct. 2 38 To be sure, the Court
overturned the constitutional judgments of executive officials in the
Bush Administration, including President George W. Bush, in two
cases-each involving the constitutional foundations for President
Bush's restrictions on access to the courts by people detained during
the military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 239 The few other cases
in which the Court has overturned Presidents' actions involved
presidential usurpations of legislative authority. 240
2. The Timing of Judicial Review
The longer it takes for courts to review non-judicial precedents,
the longer the precedents endure. An example of this dynamic is the
Tenure in Office Act, which Congress passed to curb President
Andrew Johnson's power to remove Republicans from his cabinet. 24 1
Although President Johnson vetoed the Act, Congress overrode his
veto. 242 Subsequently, Johnson refused to comply with the act, the
House impeached him, and the Senate barely acquitted him for his
non-compliance. 243 Almost sixty years later, the Court struck down the

237. From 1980 to 1989, the Supreme Court struck down 161 state or local laws, but this
number dropped to forty-eight from 1990 to 1999. From 2000 to 2002, the Court struck down
eight state or local laws, fewer than the number of federal laws struck down in the same period
(ten). See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 234, at 181-207 (showing a chart of Supreme Court
decisions holding state constitutional and statutory provisions and municipal ordinances
unconstitutional between 1789 and 2005).
238. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) (holding that President Clinton could not
use temporary immunity or invoke the doctrine of separation of powers to stay civil litigation
against him); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting President Nixon's arguments
that he did not need to comply with a court-issued subpoena).
239. See Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (holding that U.S. citizens being held
as enemy combatants must be given opportunity to contest factual basis); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (holding that the District Court had jurisdiction to hear the case from a
Guantanamo Bay detainee).
240. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1998) (holding that the Line
Item Veto violated the Presentment Clause); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 587-89 (1952) (holding the Executive branch's seizures of privately owned factories
unconstitutional).
241. See MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 46-51
(1973).

242. Id. at 146.
243. See generally id. passim.
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Act, 244 but in the meantime, twelve Presidents and many members of
Congress had to accommodate their differing opinions about its
constitutionality.
The significance of the ramifications of belated judicial review
is evident with respect to the ways in which the moral and ethical
dilemmas raised by advancements in medical technology are handled
prior to their relatively rare disposition by the Supreme Court. For
instance, Oregon's assisted suicide law had been in effect for a number
of years before it was challenged in front of the Court.245 Moreover, the
Court did not render a judgment on whether federal law preempted
this state law until 2005, more than a decade after the state had
enacted the legislation. 246 Because no court had barred implementing
the statute in the meantime, almost 200 people had chosen to die
pursuant to its procedures. The law was final for these people, their
health care providers, and their families.
C. The Binding or PersuasiveAuthority of Non-JudicialPrecedents
Non-judicial authorities generally design their precedents to
exert influence in one of two directions. First, some are designed to
exert influence vertically, as binding authority imposed by superior
authorities upon inferior ones. Second, some are designed to exert
influence horizontally, as persuasive authority within or across
equally powerful institutions. Depending on the direction of their
influence, non-judicial precedents may be categorized in the following
four ways:
1. Vertical-Vertical Non-Judicial Precedents
Vertical-vertical non-judicial precedents operate as binding
authority within the branch creating them and on other branches.
Presidential pardons exemplify such precedents. Presidents have the
unique power to pardon people for federal crimes. 247 Once pardons are
issued, they are binding on other authorities. No other constitutional
authority may undo, or undermine, a presidential pardon. Not even a
subsequent President may withdraw a predecessor's pardon. Pardons
bind every branch at the top, as well as every inferior federal and
state official.

244.
245.
246.
247.

See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-.897 (2003).
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2005).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.l.
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President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon 248 illustrates the
binding effect of presidential pardons. Congress lacked authority to
erase the pardon through legislation. 249 The most that Congress could
do was to hold oversight hearings, as it did, to inquire into Ford's
reasons for pardoning Nixon. 250 But no president believes that he has
the power to undo a presidential pardon made by a predecessor in
office. Nor do state or federal courts claim the authority to question
the terms of a pardon, and neither federal nor state prosecutors ever
have prosecuted misconduct for which a person has been formally
pardoned.
2. Vertical-Horizontal Non-Judicial Precedents
Vertical-horizontal non-judicial precedents impose binding
authority from the top-down within the institutions producing them
but are only persuasive authority in other institutions. Official
opinions from the Attorney General are examples of verticalhorizontal precedents. The Office of Legal Counsel produces official
opinions for the Attorney General in response to requests made by
executive branch officers, including the President. 2 1 These opinions
have strict binding authority throughout the executive branch, but
they are merely persuasive authority in Congress, courts, and the
states. Similarly, presidential decisions on what material to keep
confidential bind the executive branch but not other branches. At
most, they are persuasive authority in Congress and courts. Hence,
presidential and congressional disputes over executive privilege
usually are resolved through mutual accommodations reached through
252
negotiations between Presidents and Congress.

248. Proclamation No. 4311, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,601 (Sept. 10, 1974).
249. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 130 (1871) (overturning a congressional
enactment aimed at limiting the effects of presidential pardons, and noting that "[i]t was
competent for the President to annex to his offer of pardon any conditions or qualifications he
should see fit"); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866) (holding, among other things, that the
President's pardon power is "not subject to legislative control," and that "Congress can neither
limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders").
250. Pardonof Richard M. Nixon, and Related Matters: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary,93d Cong. (1974).
251. See Kmiec, supranote 172, at 337-38 (discussing generally the job of the Office of Legal
Counsel).
252. See generally LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004).
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3. Horizontal-Horizontal Non-Judicial Precedents
Horizontal-horizontal non-judicial precedents operate as
persuasive authority within the institutions creating them and in
other institutions. These precedents encompass what we commonly
refer to as traditions, customs, or historical practices. Horizontalhorizontal non-judicial precedents came into play after Chief Justice
William Rehnquist's death. President Bush had to decide initially
whether he would follow the norm of not naming a sitting Justice as
Chief Justice of the United States. Presidents usually appoint
someone from outside the Court as Chief Justice, 253 in part to avoid
friction among sitting Justices, who might have wanted the job or
were opposed to one of their colleagues becoming Chief. President
Bush chose to follow this norm.
Timing was another issue following Chief Justice Rehnquist's
death: President Bush had to decide whether to fill two vacancies on
the Court at the same time or to nominate a successor to the Chief
Justice and not name someone to replace Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor until after the Senate had confirmed Rehnquist's
successor. 254 The circumstance was unprecedented-never before had
a Chief Justice died pending hearings on a nomination to replace
another Justice, and never before had a President had the opportunity
to withdraw a nomination so he could renominate the person as Chief
Justice. In nominating John Roberts to two different seats on the
Court within a short time, President Bush made decisions that may be
taken into account as persuasive authority when and if similar
opportunities arise.
4. Horizontal-Vertical Non-Judicial Precedents
Some non-judicial precedents have horizontal effects within the
institutions creating them but vertical effects on other institutions.
For example, when the Senate Judiciary Committee approves judicial
nominations, the decisions are not binding on the senators, who cast
their votes on the floor. These decisions are regarded (indeed,
formally) as recommendations for the senators to follow. When
senators follow the recommendations (as they did with the
Committee's recommendations of both Roberts and Samuel Alito),
253. Of the nation's seventeen Chief Justices, only three-Edward Douglass White, Harlan
Fiske Stone, and William Rehnquist-were elevated to the position from within the Court.
254. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Bush to Nominate Rehnquist's Successor on Court 'Promptly"
President Must Choose Nominee, Chief Justice; Transition in the Supreme Court, BALT. SUN,
Sept. 5, 2005, at 1A.
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they do so because they are persuaded, not bound, to approve them.
But officials in other branches are bound to accept the Committee's
recommendations; they have no formal power to interfere with, or
change, the recommendations.
D. The Limited Path Dependency of Non-JudicialPrecedentsover Time
Even when non-judicial precedents are designed to constrain,
they have limited path dependency-they weakly control subsequent
constitutional decisionmaking.
1. Beyond Standards and Rules
While judicial precedents generally are framed as rules or
standards, 255 non-judicial precedents take many other forms. The nonjudicial precedents with the greatest potential to constrain subsequent
constitutional decisionmaking take the form of formal rules (such as
Senate Rule XXII governing filibusters), 256 which generally may be
amended only as they prescribe. But most non-judicial precedents are
not formal rules, and most rarely explain their justifications or
grounds in detail. 257 In many cases, much of the underlying reasoning
that has gone into the making of a non-judicial precedent is not
reduced to writing. Consequently, it may be difficult, if not impossible,
to know why certain things either happened or did not happen in the
legislative processes or at the federal or state levels.
Rational choice theory suggests that collegial institutions such
as the House or the Senate will reach inconsistent, incoherent results,
in part because of the different orderings and intensities of
preferences among its members. 258 Without knowing the orderings or
intensities of preferences, it may be impossible to know why Congress
did what it did. Nevertheless, the outcome may take on a life of its
own; an acquittal in an impeachment trial, for instance, may depend
more on how subsequent generations have come to understand it than
on what senators said at the time they rendered judgment. Yet, the
reasons given for particular actions may also matter. Just as the
significance of a judicial precedent may oftentimes depend on the

255. See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME

COURT 1-12 (2004) (discussing the "rules and principles" that emerge from various sources and
become "constitutional doctrine").
256. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
258. See generally Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional
Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245 (1979).
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quality, or persuasiveness, of its reasoning, the same could be said of
non-judicial precedents. When senators explain their votes (in
impeachment trials or on other matters), it makes it easier to
understand why they voted as they did; however, not all senators
provide such explanations.
President Clinton's acquittal in his impeachment trial is
another precedent whose meaning is uncertain. At the end of Clinton's
2 59
trial, only seventy-two senators formally explained their votes.
These seventy-two votes included thirty-four of the forty-five
Democrats who had voted not guilty on both articles of impeachment,
four of the five Republicans who had voted not guilty on both, and
three of the five Republicans who had voted not guilty on the first
article but guilty on the second article. 260 With most of the senators
who voted guilty on both articles not bothering to explain their votes
publicly, we do not know their precise reasoning. Moreover, we face
the challenge of finding the common ground among the statements
that we have. Most importantly, the fact that there have been no
subsequent impeachment trials, much less any presidential
impeachment trials, means that, as a precedent, Clinton's trial has
literally no network effects-its value and meaning are limited
because no authority, including the Senate, has had the opportunity to
define its authority.
Similarly, the precise meaning or significance of the nation's
second impeachment is a subject of ongoing debate. It involved
District Judge John Pickering, whom the House impeached on March
2, 1803, by a vote of 45-8.261 The impeachment articles charged
drunkenness and profanity on the bench and the rendering of judicial
opinions based neither on law nor fact. Although Pickering did not
appear on his own behalf before the Senate, his son filed a petition
claiming that Pickering was so ill and deranged that he was incapable
of exercising any sound judgment whatsoever and that he therefore
should not be removed from office for misconduct attributable to
insanity. Nevertheless, the Senate voted 18-2 to accept evidence of his
insanity, 19-7 to convict, and 20-6 to remove from office. Consequently,
he became the first federal official to have been impeached by the
House and formally convicted and removed from office by the Senate.

259. GERHARDT, supra note 61, at 175 (surveying the views expressed in the written
statements of senators released after Clinton's acquittal).
260. Id.
261. Unless otherwise cited, all relevant facts regarding Pickering's impeachment proceeding
have been drawn from id. at 50-51.
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Yet, disagreement among scholars and members of Congress
persists about whether Pickering's removal established a precedent for
removal based on non-indictable misconduct-i.e., misbehavior that
violates some criminal law. On the one hand, Simon Rifkind, counsel
for Justice William Douglas in the House's impeachment inquiry
against him in 1970, suggested that Pickering was charged "with
three counts of willfully violating a federal statute relating to the
posting of bond in certain attachment situations, and the
misdemeanors of public drunkenness and blasphemy." On the other
hand, some experts claim that "no federal statute made violation of
the bond-posting act a crime, nor obviously were drunkenness or
blasphemy federal crimes. The Pickering impeachment [confirms] that
the concept of high crimes and misdemeanors is not limited to
criminal offenses."
Both of these views have merit "because the question of guilt
was put in the form of asking senators whether the judge stood guilty
as charged," rather than whether the acts he allegedly committed
constituted impeachable offenses. The Senate's votes to convict may
not reflect an acknowledgment by the Senate that violations of
impeachable offenses actually were involved. Indeed, five senators
withdrew from the court of impeachment when the Senate agreed to
put the question in the form of "guilty as charged." Two senatorsboth Federalists-objected to procedural irregularities and claimed
that the question put to them failed to ask whether the charges
actually described high crimes and misdemeanors. John Quincy
Adams claimed that the other senators who withdrew-all
Republicans-objected to procedural irregularities but did not want to
separate from their party by voting to acquit the judge.
A related problem with using the Pickering impeachment and
removal as a precedent is that party fidelity seems to have played a
major role in the Senate's votes to admit the evidence of insanity and
to remove Pickering. All nineteen of the Senate's votes to acquit the
Federalist judge were cast by Republicans, while Federalists cast the
seven acquittal votes. Even the seemingly bipartisan vote to admit
evidence on Pickering's insanity can be explained on partisan grounds:
The Federalist senators may have wanted to introduce this evidence
because they hoped that proof of his insanity would have led to an
acquittal given their position that insanity was not an impeachable
offense. The Republicans might have expected the admission of the
evidence to lead to the judge's conviction because they thought it
demonstrated the need to remove him before he damaged the political
system any further. In any event, the party-line voting was consistent
with an apparent Republican strategy to employ the impeachment
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process to create vacancies in the federal judiciary by ousting
Federalist judges, of which Pickering was one of the easiest to
262
remove.
2. The Absence of Rules for Constructing Non-Judicial Precedents
The absence of rules for constructing non-judicial precedents
impedes their discoverability and interpretations. First, the
significance of governmental inaction may be hard to define. The fact
that legislatures may have failed to do certain things-such as
foregoing criminal prosecution of homosexual activity on a wide scale
basis-may be significant to the extent that the Court recognizes this
failure as constituting a tradition. Moreover, the Senate Judiciary
Committee might have failed, for undisclosed or unacknowledged
reasons, to hold hearings or votes on pending judicial nominations.
But the absence of a hearing does not rob the event of precedential
significance. It might have been the result of a chair's decision simply
not to schedule a hearing or a vote, and the Chair might have done
this with or without consultation with other members of the
Committee. A committee's failures to hold hearings are precedents on
the basic authority of its chair to schedule matters as he sees fit.
This is hardly the extent of the legal significance that
committee inaction may have. In the absence of a formal hearing,
there is no occasion-and no need-for either the chair or the
committee members to explain themselves. The Senate rules provide,
however, that a nomination lapses and becomes void if it is not
approved or acted on by the end of the legislative session in which it
was made. 26 3 Senate rules invest inactivity with some significance.
Failures to hold hearings or votes make the significance of inactivity
malleable. Such failures can mean almost anything-or nothing,
depending on the interpreter's needs. Thus, the Senate Judiciary
Committee's failure to hold a hearing on President Clinton's
nomination of Elena Kagan to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia means different things to different senators. For
many senators, the failure to hold a hearing might signify nothing, as
264
the Committee never held a hearing or vote on her nomination.
Other senators might construe the failure to hold a hearing or vote as
262. See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS
OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 127-28 (1992).

263. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 110-9, R. XXXI § 6, at 43-44 (2007).
264. See Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 35, pt. 1, 11-12 (2003) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) (noting that
Kagan, a nominee to the D.C. Circuit, waited eighteen months without a hearing).
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the result of the need to accommodate other pressing business or of a
longstanding impasse between Democrats and Republicans over
whether the court's caseload justified filling a vacant seat. 265 For other
senators, the failure to hold a hearing for Kagan might have been the
consequence of a desire to keep the seat open for the next President to
fill. 266 The credibility of any of these interpretations depends on how
well it fits the facts.
A similar interpretive challenge arises when the Judiciary
Committee formally recommends not sending nominations to the full
Senate. Only occasionally do committee members explain their votes
before casting them. Senators tend to be most expansive in highprofile hearings, as demonstrated in the confirmation proceedings on
John Roberts's nomination as Chief Justice. 267 With the proceedings
covered by national media, senators had a strong incentive to be
present for as much as possible. The committee members each had
lengthy statements, and each had relatively long questions or
comments to pose to the witness. In lower-profile proceedings, the
record tends to be less complete. Even when senators explain their
votes, they may not make full statements, and it is possible that their
statements do not include all the reasons for their votes. Statements
might draw from prior proceedings, not because they are binding, but
because they are persuasive authority. Thus, the Senate Judiciary
Committee's rejection of President Bush's nomination of Priscilla
Owen to the Fifth Circuit in 2001 meant different things to Democrats
and Republicans. Many Democrats construed the event as an instance
in which they blocked confirmation of a nominee with a judicial
ideology with which they disagreed, 268 while some Republicans
construed Owen's rejection as driven by a petty desire for payback for
Republicans' failure to confirm some of President Clinton's judicial
nominees. 269 A similar interpretive problem arose with respect to the
265. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Janice R. Brown, of California, to be
Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th
Cong. 463, 4 (2003) (statement of Sen. Richard J. Durbin) (citing the argument of Senate
Republicans that the D.C. Circuit did not need additional justices while Kagan's nomination was
pending).
266. See Confirmation Hearing on Federal Appointments, supra note 264, at 7 (citing the
Committee's refusal to hold hearings on some of President Clinton's nominees).
267. See 151 CONG. REC. S10, 631-48 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2005) (containing statements from
various senators explaining the reasons for their votes on the Roberts nomination).
268. See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at Ai (citing Owen's use of personal views on abortion in her decisionmaking process and her propensity to favor corporations).
269. See Audrey Hudson, Texas Judge Rejected for the Federal Bench; Came under Fire for
Being a Court "Activist,' WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at A4; Carl Hulse, Fight on Judges and
FilibustersOpens in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2005, at Al.
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Democrats' successful filibuster against President Bush's nomination
of William Pryor to the Eleventh Circuit in 2003. Many Democrats
defended the filibuster as precluding the confirmation of a
conservative ideologue or activist, 270 while some Republicans 27charged
1
that the opposition to Pryor's was based on anti-Catholic bias.
Second, the meanings or values of non-judicial precedents, like
those of judicial decisions, depend in part on how they have been cited
or used in the past. The more opinions that have been expressed about
the meaning of a particular non-judicial activity, the more latitude
that subsequent authorities will have to choose on which, if any, of
those opinions to rely. This may be true even for events that are cited
or referenced frequently. Such is the case, for instance, with the full
Senate's votes on judicial nominations. The significance of a particular
vote depends not just on how senators construe it at the time they vote
but also how subsequent senators understand it. Thus, events such as
the Senate's rejections of President Washington's nomination of John
Rutledge as Chief Justice and President Reagan's nomination of
Robert Bork do not yet have firmly fixed network effects. While
Rutledge's rejection has been cited more than enough times to make it
easily discoverable, many people cite it as authority for rejecting a
Supreme Court nominee because of his ideology, 272 while others claim
that it is authority for rejecting nominees because of doubts over their
sanity.273 Bork's rejection stands as a watershed event in which the
Senate targeted nominees because of their ideology, 274 payback for
Bork's firing of special prosecutor Archibald Cox and other
misdeeds, 275 and Bork's confirmation conversion in which he appeared
to have abandoned prior positions he had taken in order to be

270. See Bob Dart, Democrats Block Vote on Judgeship, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 7, 2003, at
A15.
271. See Neil A. Lewis, Judicial Nominee Advances Amid Dispute over Religion, N.Y. TIMES,
July 24, 2003, at A17 (citing the claims of Senators Sessions and Hatch that Pryor was opposed
because of his pro-life viewpoint as a "solid Catholic individual").
272. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 121, at 51-52 (discussing the impact of Rutledge's
refusal to support the Jay treaty).
273. See, e.g., HENRY FLANDERS, THE LIVES AND TIMES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT 641-42 (1875) (blaming Rutledge's rejection on the "condition of his intellect,"
which was common knowledge, and noting that this rejection likely put an end to any of his
remaining sanity).
274. See NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: JUDGE BORK
AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 247 (1998) (indicating the clear precedent

Bork's confirmation hearings set for Senate rejections of nominees for solely ideological reasons).
275. See GERHARDT, supra note 121, at 163 (citing Bork's opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and his actions against the first special Watergate prosecutor).
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confirmed. 276 Others believe that it resulted from the convergence of
many factors, including President Reagan's belated defense of Bork
against public attacks 277 and Bork's alienation of many senators
278
during his public testimony.
Third, non-judicial precedents bind less forcefully because of
the norm allowing members the freedom to make independent
judgments on constitutional matters. 2 79 In practice, this means that
legislators are free to challenge procedures or prior judgments (made
by committees or the entire bodies) that they regard as
unconstitutional. Their independence extends to factfinding and
figuring out what standard governs their decisionmaking in different
contexts. In Supreme Court confirmation hearings, senators decide
what criteria nominees must meet. 28 0 Similarly, in removal trials,
senators decide on the applicable burdens of proof and evidentiary
rules. 281 Senators may feel obliged to follow their earlier practices in
addressing the same constitutional question(s), but they may change
their minds for many reasons, including party fealty, short-term
political expediency, and their conceptions of what is in the nation's
28 2
best interests.
The limited path dependency of non-judicial precedents does
not mean that precedents lack influence. As Part III shows, they
perform other important functions in constitutional law.

276. ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA

241-46 (1989).
277. GERHARDT, supra note 121, at 83.
278. See BRONNER, supra note 276, at 275-76 (recounting Bork's description of the Supreme
Court as "an intellectual feast," confirming the fear of many that Bork "just wanted to play with
ideas" and was unaware "that beyond those elegant intellectual constructs, the lives of real
people hung in the balance").
279. See Louis Fisher, ConstitutionalInterpretationby Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV.
707, 743 (1985) (arguing that the political process is best served when members of Congress
judge constitutional issues independently because constitutional questions often have political
and social impact).
280. GERHARDT, supra note 121, at 314.
281. GERHARDT, supra note 61, at 112-16.

282. For example, Senate-majority leader Bill Frist, who has vigorously protested the use of
the filibuster on judicial nominees, had participated in filibusters against President Clinton's
judicial nominees previously. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, THE REPUBLICAN FLIP-FLOP
ON

FILIBUSTERS

(2003),

http://democrats.senate.gov/dpc/dpc-new.cfm?docname=sr-108-1-199

(citing Frist's votes against cloture and for indefinite postponement of a confirmation vote for
Richard Paez, nominated to the Ninth Circuit).
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III. THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF NON-JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
Social scientists generally presume not only that precedent is
synonymous with judicial decision but also that the sole meaningful
function of precedent is constraint. In fact, non-judicial precedents
perform many functions besides constraint and influence the law in
myriad ways.
A. Modalities of Argumentation
Generally, precedent is one of the traditional modes of
constitutional argument. 28 3 Justices and many other public officials
are trained in the law and thus familiar with its special language,
which is expressed in and through precedents. Law schools train
students to read cases and to argue from case law. Just as
importantly, practitioners, whether in the public or private sector, are
deeply immersed in the art of reading cases. When people steeped in
the law become public authorities, they enter office prepared to think
and to argue in terms of precedent. They not only appreciate that
precedent-based arguments are an important stock in trade but also
are aware that a natural part of their job is to construct precedents.
Examples abound of non-judicial authorities making precedent-based
asserted
arguments. For instance, precedent was an important 28basis
4
filibusters.
judicial
ban
to
option"
"constitutional
the
for
Similarly, precedent was an important mode of argumentation
during President Clinton's impeachment proceedings. 28 5 The critical
question before members of Congress was the extent to which
Clinton's misconduct was the same as the misconduct for which
several judges had been impeached and removed from office. For those
urging his ouster from office, Clinton's misconduct was identical to
that for which these three judges had been ousted from office in the

283. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7-8, 93

(1982) (describing judicial but not non-judicial precedent as one the six modalities through which
constitutional arguments may be made).
284. See Gold & Gupta, supra note 85, at 220-26 (recounting the initial introduction of the
"constitutional option" by Senator Walsh, who cited the Constitution, past practices of the
Senate, and general parliamentary procedure for support).
285. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. 81337, 1355 (1999) (statement of Rep. McCollum) ("Can you
imagine how damaging that would be to our constitutional form of government, to set the
precedent that no President will be removed from office for high crimes and misdemeanors
unless polls show that the public wants that to happen?"); 144 CONG. REC. H11774, 11800 (1998)
(statement of Sen. Lofgren) ("By [voting for conviction,] ... you will set the dangerous precedent
that the certainty of presidential terms, which has so benefited our wonderful America, will be
replaced by the partisan use of impeachment ... ").
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1980s: Harry Claiborne for income tax evasion and, thus, for
misconduct that had no formal connection to his duties as a judge,
Alcee Hastings for perjury, and Walter Nixon for making false
statements to a grand jury. 28 6 Clinton's critics further likened his
misconduct to the obstruction of justice charge in the second
impeachment article approved by the House Judiciary Committee
against Richard Nixon. 28 7 In contrast, Clinton's defenders
distinguished his misconduct from that of removed officials. They
likened his behavior either to Richard Nixon's alleged income tax
evasion, which the House Judiciary Committee chose not to make the
basis of an impeachment article, 288 or to Andrew Johnson's
misconduct-failing to abide by the Tenure in Office Act-of which the
289
Senate acquitted him.
B. Agenda Setting
Non-judicial precedents convey agendas just as judicial
precedents do. Non-judicial actors send signals to courts, but not all
their signals are sent through precedents. Non-judicial authorities
send signals in part to make the Court aware of pertinent non-judicial
precedents, as may have been the case with efforts in the 1990s to
enact habitual offender laws 290 or more recent efforts to regulate
same-sex marriages. 291 Non-judicial actors also seek to construct
precedents to influence not only the agendas of their respective states

286. See 145 CONG. REC. S1791, 1792-93 (1999) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (calling for
Clinton's impeachment as consistent with these historical precedents).
287. See 145 CONG. REC. S869, 873 (1999) (statement of Rep. Canady) (noting that the
Judiciary Committee used the articles of impeachment drafted against Nixon to draft the articles
against Clinton).
288. See 145 CONG. REC. S1775, 1778 (1999) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (citing the
argument that Nixon's alleged tax evasion was not an impeachable offense because it was not
directly related to one of the President's duties); see also Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Proceduraland
Factual Insufficiencies in the Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, reprinted in 145 CONG.
REC. S1564, 1588 (1999) (citing Professor Tribe's argument that Clinton's behavior, like Nixon's
tax evasion, presents no threat of becoming a model of emulation).
289. See, e.g., Senator Joseph R. Biden's Comprehensive Statement on Impeachment
Deliberations, reprinted in 145 CONG. REC. S1462, 1481 (1999) (arguing that Clinton's
impeachment proceedings, like Johnson's, were motivated by "policy disagreements and personal
animosity").
290. Cf. Ahmed A. White, The Juridical Structure of Habitual Offender Laws and the
Jurisprudence of Authoritarian Social Control, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 705 (2006) (explaining
that, between 1993 and 1995, twenty-six states and the federal government enacted habitual
offender laws).
291. See Christine Vestal, Gay MarriageDecisions Ripe in 2 Courts, STATELINE.ORG, Mar. 1,
2007, http://www.stateline.orglive/details/story?contentId=20695 (surveying state laws on samesex marriage).
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but also the agendas of other states (and the federal government), as
has been the case with the spate of state referenda and constitutional
amendments restricting same-sex marriage. 292 With these enactments,
state authorities have tried to do many things at once-make a point,
appease important constituencies, encourage other states to follow
suit, fortify their marriage laws from judicial challenges, and bolster
(or impede) arguments that tradition supports prohibitions of samesex marriage.
C. FacilitatingConstitutionalDialogues
It is quite common for constitutional scholars to analogize
judicial review to a dialogue. 293 The idea is that judicial precedents are
instrumental to an exchange of opinions about questions of
constitutional meaning and design among the Court, political leaders,
and the public. 294 The dialogue may serve many different ends, not the
least of which is educating the public about constitutional law.
The late Alexander Bickel proposed one of the best known
theories of precedent as facilitating constitutional dialogue. He
argued, "Virtually all important decisions of the Supreme Court are
the beginnings of conversations between the Court and the people and
296
their representatives." 295 For instance, Brown v. Board of Education
is often characterized as deliberately framed to foster a national
dialogue about the constitutionality of state-mandated segregation. As
Robert Burt explains, "[T]he justices acknowledged among themselves
that, in pragmatic terms at least, nothing would follow from the
Brown decision unless support voluntarily came from the President
and Congress." 29 7 The Court in Brown thus asked for briefing on the
question whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood that "future Congresses might, in the exercise of their
power under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish" state-mandated

292. See id.
293. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL
PROCESS 64-84 (1988) (discussing several examples of forces external to the courts that influence
constitutional interpretation); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV.
577, 668-70 (1993) (explaining how the courts synthesize society's views and turn them back to
society for further discourse).
294. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 961, 966-69 (1992) (commenting on the literature on the Court as educator);
Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208
(1952) (providing a well-known defense of the Court as educator on constitutional questions).
295. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 91 (1970).

296. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
297. ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 295 (1992).
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segregation in public schools, even if "neither the Congress in
submitting nor the states in ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment
understood that compliance with it would require the immediate
abolition of segregation in public schools." 298 Brown required the
support of the executive and legislative branches to ensure that its
decision became law.
Robert Post agrees that judicial decisions are instrumental to
public dialogues about constitutional matters. For instance, he
construes the "best interpretation" of Lawrence v. Texas, which struck
down Texas' anti-sodomoy law, "as the opening bid in a conversation
that the Court expects to hold with the American public. The Court
has advanced a powerful and passionate statement that is plainly
designed to influence the ongoing national debate about the
constitutional status of homosexuality." 299
Post envisions a dialogue that shapes and is shaped by
American culture, which he defines as "the beliefs and values of
nonjudicial actors." 30 0 Although he recognizes that culture "comes in
myriad different guises," he argues that "constitutional law and
culture are locked in a dialectical relationship, so that constitutional
law both arises from and regulates culture." 30 1 Post points to the
Rehnquist Court's decisions construing the scope of Congress's power
pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment as
demonstrating "that the Court in fact commonly constructs
constitutional law in the context of an ongoing dialogue with culture,
so that culture is inevitably (and properly) incorporated into the warp
and woof of constitutional law." 302 The Court is not "autonomous from
culture." 30 3 Instead, it "defines the substance of constitutional law in
the context of the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors. 30 4
But there are many public exchanges in which the Court is
peripheral or not involved. Many of these may be designed to educate
the public, or others, about different constitutional issues or
procedures. For instance, judicial nominees may learn from prior
judicial confirmation hearings what they should say (or should not
say) to get confirmed by the Senate. The Senate's confirmation
hearings on Robert Bork's nomination as Associate Justice have been

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id. at 296.
Post, supra note 2, at 104-05 (citation omitted).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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described as a seminar on constitutional law. 305 In its aftermath,
Senator Joseph Biden pointed to those hearings as an example of the
proper functioning of the Senate on Supreme Court nominations.30 6 In
the midst of the confirmation hearings on John Roberts's nomination
as Chief Justice, Republican and Democratic senators disagreed over
the extent to which the earlier confirmation hearings on Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's nomination to the Court provided an example of either a
candid or a reticent nominee. 30 7 Senators treated her hearings as
instructive on how forthcoming a Court nominee ought to be before the
Senate Judiciary Committee.3 08 Moreover, the Bork confirmation
hearings often are construed as a demonstration of the problems that
inhere when a nominee is too candid and expansive in responding to
Judiciary Committee questions. 30 9 In an apparent attempt to define
the significance of his own confirmation as a precedent, Chief Justice
Roberts, immediately after being sworn into office, told his audience
what lesson his confirmation had taught-that judging is distinct from
politics. 310 The Roberts hearings and preceding ones influenced the
next Supreme Court confirmation hearings, in which Justice Alito
followed the examples of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg
in answering questions, and senators from both sides tried to educate
the (listening) public about the nominee's virtues or flaws, the Court,
31
and the proper scope of questioning. '
305. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "FundamentalRight" That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1901 n.28 (2004) (describing the nation's interest in the
Bork confirmation hearings due, in part, to its extensive discussion of constitutional protections
for "unenumerated rights").
306. See Joseph R. Biden, The Constitution, The Senate, and the Court, 24 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 951, 954-56 (1989) (arguing that the Senate should be able to reject judicial nominees on
the basis of their judicial philosophies).
307. See 151 CONG. REC. S10,461, 10,467-68 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Graham) (reciting Justice Ginsburg's refusals to answer questions in her own confirmation
hearings). But see 151 CONG. REC. S9908, 9909 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Boxer) (suggesting that Justice Ginsburg was far more forthcoming than Republican senators at
the Roberts hearing were suggesting).
308. 151 CONG. REC. S9211, 9212-13 (daily ed. July 28, 2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(urging the application of the Ginsburg rule--"no hints, no forecasts, no previews"-at the
Roberts hearing).
309. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS x-xi (1994) (suggesting that confirmations based solely on the "direction
in which the minds of our Justices should be closed" are damaging judicial independence).
310. John G. Roberts, Chief Justice, President's Remarks at Swearing-In Ceremony of Chief
Justice Roberts (Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/200509293.html ("I view the vote this morning as confirmation of what is for me a bedrock principle, that
judging is different from politics .... ").
311. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 277, at 18 (2006) (statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden).
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Non-judicial precedents were a major concern in a more recent
separation-of-powers conflict. The House and Senate Judiciary
Committees each scheduled oversight hearings to investigate
inconsistent statements made by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
(and other administration officials) about President George W. Bush's
firings of eight United States Attorneys for political reasons, rather
than for poor performance. 12 In the course of the hearings, one
current and two former White House officials refused to comply with
subpoenas to testify before the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees. 313 Fred Fielding, the Chief White House Counsel,
explained their refusals on the grounds that forcing them to testify
would violate the well-settled principle of executive privilege.3 14 In
response to Fielding's (and the officials' private counsels') repeated
assertion of this principle, the Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, John Conyers, Jr., urged the full House to vote to hold the
officials in contempt based, in part, on the fact that "sitting and
former White House officials have testified before Congress numerous
times." In fact, he cited one study that indicated "approximately 74
instances where serving White House advisers had testified before
Congress since World War II."315 In a subsequent letter to Senators
Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
White House Counsel Fielding explained that the refusal of former
White House adviser Karl Rove to testify was based in part on the
need to establish a precedent that would benefit future presidents.3 16
As
this
separation-of-powers
example
shows,
some
constitutional conflicts involve more than exchanges of constitutional

312. See Bob Dart & Ken Herman, Senators OK Rove, Miers Subpoenas, AUSTIN AM.STATESMAN, Mar. 23, 2007, at A01.
313. See Memorandum from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, to
Members
of the Committee on the Judiciary (July 24, 2007), available at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/contempt memo-072407.pdf, Press
Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Senate Judiciary Committee Approves Contempt Citations
for Rove, Bolten in Bipartisan Vote (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/
200712/121307a.html.
314. See Letter from Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the
Judiciary (June 28, 2007).
315. See Conyers, supra note 313, at 41-42 (citing Harold C. Relyea & Todd B. Tatelman,
PresidentialAdvisers' Testimony before Congressional Committees: An Overview, CRS Report for
Congress Order Code RL 31351, Apr. 10, 2007).
316. See Letter from Fred Fielding, Counsel to the President, to Patrick Leahy, Chairman,
and Senator Arlen Specter, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Aug. 1, 2007) ("[T]he President
remains committed to protecting the ability of future Presidents to ensure that the Executive's
decisions reflect and benefit from the candid exchange of informed and diverse viewpoints and
open and frank deliberations that such a privilege provides.").
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viewpoints. Some dialogues have ramifications for the structure of
government. Consequently, the next Section examines the different
ways in which non-judicial precedents influence constitutional
structure.
D. Shaping ConstitutionalStructure
Non-judicial precedents clarify and shape constitutional
structure in two significant ways. First, the organizations of the
executive and legislative branches, administrative agencies, and state
governments depend largely on the discoverable constitutional
judgments of Presidents, members of Congress, administrative
officials, and state leaders. Moreover, non-judicial precedents shape
the federal courts through choices made about their composition,
funding, and jurisdiction. This is not to mention how, as previously
317
discussed, judicial doctrine is informed by non-judicial precedents.
Second, non-judicial precedents define the channels through
which certain decisions must go in order to be lawful. 318 For example,
Presidents have worked out with Congress different options for
executing international trade agreements. The first option is to
execute international agreements by treaty. Ratification of treaties
requires a vote of approval by at least two-thirds of the Senate, 319 but
questions regarding negotiation and termination of treaties have been
left largely to the political branches to work out between themselves.
Over time, Presidents have claimed the prerogative to terminate and
to negotiate treaties, though both often are done with substantial
320
congressional consultation.
A second way to create international agreements is through
executive agreement. Although the Constitution does not specifically
mention executive agreements, they were known in President
Washington's day and the United States commonly uses them to
establish international agreements. 321 Congress has recognized the
constitutionality of negotiating executive agreements by enacting the
Case Act, which requires the Secretary of State to transmit the text of

317. See supra notes 196-207, 295-304 and accompanying text.
318. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
JudicialReview, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1106-14 (2003).

319. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2.
320. See JOHN N. MOORE, THE NATIONAL LAW OF TREATY IMPLEMENTATION 378-405 (2001).
321. Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?108 HARv. L. REV. 801, 820
(1995).
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agreements other than treaties to each chamber for informational
322
purposes.
There are three types of unilateral executive agreements. First,
3 23
treaty-based executive agreements are made pursuant to treaties.
They enjoy the same legal status as the treaties that authorize them
so long as they are consistent with, and within the scope of, those
treaties. Second, congressional-executive agreements are those
authorized by statute. These agreements are complete alternatives to
treaties. 324 They are approved, not by a supermajority vote in the
Senate, but rather by majority vote in each chamber of Congress. Like
treaties, these agreements (including NAFTA) may become the
supreme law of the land and thus supersede inconsistent state laws
and any inconsistent provisions in earlier treaties, other international
agreements, or statutes. Third, executive agreements are those
international agreements that a President makes solely under his own
authority. 325 Thus, the President, as Commander in Chief, may make
armistice agreements. The question whether particular agreements
are lawful international agreements is usually determined outside of
the courts. But even when the agreements are challenged, courts
generally have deferred to national political leaders. For instance, the
Court has held that a President's authority to recognize foreign
governments is sufficient to authorize unilateral-executive agreements
326
to settle issues as necessary to establish diplomatic relations.
Also, non-judicial precedents largely govern how the nation
may go to war. 327 First, there are declarations of war, which usually
follow the incidence of war and are used to recognize preexisting
states as adversaries. 328 Declarations also might initiate hostilities if
they were, for instance, in the form of ultimata. Second, statutes may
become the basis on which a President validly may commit the armed
forces to combat without returning to Congress for further
authorization.3 29 Third, joint resolutions may provide a basis for using
military force. 330 In recent years, joint resolutions authorized military
322. Pub. L. No 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2006)).
323. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt. f

(1987).
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. § 303 cmt. e.
Id. § 303 cmt. g.
See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
See generally W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS:

WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND OLIVE BRANCH? 9 (1981).

328. Bobbitt, supra note 111, at 1393.
329. Id.
330. See id. at 1365 (discussing the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the commitment of armed
forces to the conflict based on that Resolution).
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actions in Kuwait, Afghanistan, and, most recently, Iraq. Fourth,
Presidents may unilaterally deploy military forces to rebuff imminent
threats to the U.S. military, national security, Americans abroad, or
civil order. 331 The question whether something constitutes an
imminent threat is left exclusively to the discretion of non-judicial
actors, and thus the only pertinent precedents are made by nonjudicial actors.
E. HistoricalFunctionsof Precedents
Non-judicial precedents perform several historical functions.
First, they make constitutional history, as was the case with the series
332
of congressional regulations in the territories before the Civil War.
Whether these laws either provoked or delayed secession, they were
the product of extensive congressional debates over the extent of
Congress's regulatory power over slavery in the territories.
Second, precedents are history in the making. President
Thomas Jefferson's decision to forego congressional approval for the
Louisiana Purchase not only significantly expanded the United States
but also set an important precedent on the necessity of getting
333
congressional approval for similar acquisitions in the future.
Similarly, President Jefferson's decision to direct military force
against the Barbary pirates without congressional approval helped to
eliminate a threat to American commerce and lives and also was one
of the earliest in a series of unilateral presidential initiatives to
employ military force without explicit congressional approval. 334 More
recently, Southern resistance to civil rights legislation through
filibuster explains the failure of such legislation to pass the Senate
335
from the Reconstruction era until 1957.
Third, non-judicial precedents chronicle constitutional history.
Many non-judicial actors reach historical findings or produce their
own histories of pertinent matters. For instance, many of the official
memoranda of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel

331. Id. at 1394.
332. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801-1829,

at 232-49 (2001).
333. Id. at 112-13.
334. Id. at 124.
335. See ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 683-

1012 (2002) (discussing the fact that no federal civil rights legislation was passed from the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 until the Civil Rights Act of 1957, with the filibuster as the main tool for
blocking such legislation).
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include the office's own historiography on pertinent issues. 336 Thus, its
opinions are important for the counsel and for the historical support
they provide. Similarly, in preparation for its hearings on President
Nixon's misconduct, the eminent historian C. Vann Woodward
prepared a history of impeachment for the House Judiciary Committee
that still serves as one of the most important resources available for
understanding the origins and scope of the federal impeachment
337
process.
Indeed, non-judicial authorities produce valuable distillations
of non-judicial precedents. The Congressional Record is replete with
Congress's prior constitutional activities, which can be assembled by
anyone. Consequently, there are several noteworthy compilations of
congressional precedents. 33 8 Moreover, members of Congress may
direct constitutional questions to the Congressional Research Service,
which routinely produces memoranda describing and analyzing
pertinent precedents. In addition, presidential decisions are reported
in The Messages and Papers of the President, which includes
executive orders, veto messages, State of the Union messages, and
other official presidential directives or actions. Different units in the
executive branch as well as the White House Counsel's Office also
compile useful distillations of precedent. They may record their own
past judgments or perhaps longer distillations of relevant precedents
for some desired action(s). For example, in 1966 the State Department
Legal Adviser's Office produced a memorandum collecting more than
125 incidents in which the President used the armed forces abroad
339
without obtaining prior congressional authorization.

336. See, e.g., Deputization of Members of Congress as Special Deputy U.S. Marshals, 18 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 125 (1994) (arguing that deputizing members of Congress as special Deputy
U.S. Marshals conflicts with historical practices); Recess Appointments During an Intrasession
Recess, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 15, 16 (1992) (arguing that past practice indicates presidents
may exercise recess appointment power during intra-session recesses of eighteen days).
337. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, RESPONSES OF THE PRESIDENT TO CHARGES OF
MISCONDUCT (1974).
338. See generally 6-11 CLARENCE CANNON, CANNON'S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNTIED STATES INCLUDING REFERENCES TO PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS, AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1935); 10-16 LEWIS
DESCHLER & WILLIAM HOLMES BROWN, DESCHLER-BROWN PRECEDENTS OF THE UNTIED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; LEWIS DESCHLER, PROCEDURE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 97TH CONGRESS: A SUMMARY OF THE MODERN PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES OF
THE HOUSE 86TH CONGRESS-97TH CONGRESS (1982); 1-6 ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS' PRECEDENTS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING REFERENCES TO
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAWS, AND DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE.

339. Memorandum from the Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, The Legality of
United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam (1966), reprinted in 1 THE VIETNAM WAR
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 583, 597 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1968).
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Last but not least, non-judicial precedents are the means by
which non-judicial actors try to put themselves on the right side of
history. For example, in passing non-binding resolutions, the House of
Representatives may have been trying to align themselves with what
340
they regard as the likely verdict of history on the Iraq War.
F. Shaping National Identity
One conventional mode of constitutional argument is ethos, or
arguments about what makes the American people or nation
distinctive. Non-judicial precedents are instrumental in constructing
national identity. For instance, "manifest destiny" was central to how
Americans viewed their nation in the first half of the nineteenth
century; it encapsulated the country's drive to acquire new territories
and expand dominion over what has become the continental United
States. 341 Similarly, the "rule of law," whose vindication, many people
believed, required the removal of Bill Clinton is another, essential
component of the identity or character of this nation. 342 Moreover, it is
common to measure the legality of the Bush administration's
warrantless wiretapping and techniques in interrogating detainees on
how well they fit our national character or identity. 343 Political
leaders' repeated declaration of their commitment to appointing
judges "who will interpret the law and not legislate from the bench" is
an obvious effort to fit this conception of judging into our national
identity. Similarly, Chief Justice John Roberts's analogizing of judging
to umpiring tapped into a common perception in our culture of how
judges should act.
Additionally, non-judicial precedents shape the background
norms or default rules in constitutional adjudication. When Justices
340. See, e.g., Carol Lochhead, Dems in Congress Up Ante on the War, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 15,
2007, at Al.
341. See generally ANDERS STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY: AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM AND
THE EMPIRE OF RIGHT (1995); ALBERT K. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY: A STUDY OF
NATIONALIST EXPANSIONISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1935).
342. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT,
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON 155 (1999) ("[The] rule of law values ...

[breached by Clinton are] important ingredients in America's success; they are essential to the
freedom and wealth that distinguish the United States from most other nations. Because
America is so heterogeneous, it relies very heavily on law to hold everything together.").
343. See, e.g., Editorial, Spying on Americans, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2005, at B06 (asserting
that "[tihe tools of foreign intelligence are not consistent with a democratic society"); Editorial,
The War President: Spying without Oversight No Mere Matter of Trust, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Dec. 20, 2005, at 10 (criticizing President Bush's policy of warrantless wiretapping after first
declaring that "[niothing is more fundamental to the American system of government than the
freedom of individuals against the heavy hand of government").
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acknowledge these, they are revealing (perhaps unconsciously) the
non-judicial beliefs or values on which they are relying to decide
constitutional questions. Among the default rules or norms that
Justices have derived from our culture (and which they may view as
fundamental to our national character or identity) are Justice Antonin
Scalia's certitude that legislative committee reports primarily are
drafted to influence judicial construction; 344 Justice Clarence Thomas's
default rule that constitutional ambiguities or gaps ought to be
construed in favor of state sovereignty; 345 and Justice John Paul
Stevens's default rule that constitutional ambiguities or gaps ought to
346
be construed in favor of federal authority.
G. Implementing ConstitutionalValues
One of precedent's most important functions is implementing
the Constitution. The Constitution is not self-executing; its various
provisions did not spring forth spontaneously at the moment of
ratification. Instead, the public, working in concert with national and
state authorities, made the Constitution operational. The institutions
that the Constitution authorizes materialize only after people have
put them into effect. The interaction of judicial and non-judicial
precedents is instrumental to affecting constitutional directives and
guarantees. The Court, for instance, did not come into being (or
receive its funding, or even the building it occupies) without the aid of
other authorities. Moreover, the Court must rely on the other
branches to enforce its opinions; it has had to turn more than once to
the President for enforcement of its decrees. Meanwhile, the political

344. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional
committee reports is well aware, the references [in the Committee Report on which the majority
relies] were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own initiative, and at
worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of
those references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill meant...
but rather to influence judicial construction.").
345. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 847-48 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("As far as the Federal Constitution is concerned ... the States can exercise all
powers that the Constitution does not withhold from them. The Federal Government and the
States thus face different default rules: Where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a
particular power-that is, where the Constitution does not speak either expressly or by
necessary implication-the Federal Government lacks that power and the States enjoy it. These
basic principles are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment.").
346. See, e.g., id. at 805 (majority opinion) ("The Tenth Amendment... provides no basis for
concluding that the States possess reserved power to add qualifications to those that are fixed in
the Constitution ....In the absence of any constitutional delegation to the States of power to
add qualifications to those enumerated in the Constitution, such a power does not exist.").
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branches are expected to keep each other in check. At the same time,
each is exploring the outer boundaries of its respective powers.
The difficulty with much constitutional scholarship is that it
fails to account for, much less examine, how the interplay between
judicial and non-judicial precedents, or among non-judicial precedents,
affects the implementation of constitutional ideals. In the final Part, I
consider the ramifications that the phenomena of non-judicial
precedents pose for understanding the most troubling questions in
constitutional theory, including why constitutional values are not
implemented perfectly.
IV. THE NORMATIVE RAMIFICATIONS OF NON-JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS
Imperfect implementation of constitutional values is one of
three significant, confounding constitutional dilemmas. Two other,
more longstanding problems are whether the Constitution requires or
allows judicial supremacy and how to resolve the counter-majoritarian
difficulty posed by unprincipled judicial interference with democratic
decisionmaking. Below, I explain how non-judicial precedents help to
resolve each of these issues.
A. JudicialNon-Supremacy
For many reasons, it is a mistake to think that the
Constitution authorizes or allows judicial supremacy. First, as I have
shown, non-judicial precedents are not only far more extensive than
judicial precedents and just as enduring, but they also shape the
Court and its doctrine.
Second, judicial supremacy is problematic because it will
discourage non-judicial actors from taking their own, independent
constitutional interpretation seriously. The political checks on the
Court-including congressional regulation of federal jurisdiction
funding of the courts, Presidents' nominating powers, the Senate's
"Advice and Consent" authority, 347 and the impeachment processesare meaningful only as long as they actually keep the Court in check.
But in a regime of judicial supremacy, they would not do so.
Presidents and members of Congress would have little if any incentive
to be cautious, or responsible, when interpreting the Constitution;
they would expect the Court to do all the heavy lifting in
constitutional interpretation. Judicial supremacy demotes the leaders

347. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2.
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of the other branches to subordinate actors in constitutional
construction.
Third, judicial supremacy exacts a big price, for it comes at the
expense of popular sovereignty. "We the People" are the ultimate
sovereign in our constitutional order, 348 but judicial supremacy leaves
us with no meaningful opportunity to participate in constitutional
interpretation, except perhaps through efforts to amend the
Constitution. In a regime in which the people are at least as important
to constitutional construction as the Court, the people will become
more active (and interested in participating) in constitutional
dialogues when they know their participation matters. This was
evident with two recent exercises of direct democracy. On November 7,
2006, eight states enacted measures similar to those in twenty-seven
other states restricting their governments' abilities to take private
property for private redevelopment. 349 These measures are
repudiations of the Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London to
defer to a city's determination that there was a "public use" for the
taking of private property to benefit private developers because of the
city's "broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use
of the takings power." 350 Similarly, in the past three years, only one
state-Arizona--out of twenty-eight rejected proposed constitutional
amendments restricting same-sex marriage. 35 1 These efforts probably
would not occur or would be meaningless in a regime of judicial
supremacy.
Judicial supremacy also cannot be squared with the Court's
inability to settle the most pressing constitutional controversies. The
most serious constitutional disputes are crises that arise when public
authorities disagree over whether the Constitution provides the
means for settling a dispute. For instance, the Court did not
determine how the House should resolve the 1800 presidential election
in which Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr tied in the Electoral
College.3 52 Instead, the House brokered a deal in favor of Jefferson and
then joined the Senate in successfully proposing the Twelfth
Amendment. 35 3 Nor did the Court resolve the problem of secession.
348. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ('We the people of the United States ...").
349. Editorial, Ballot Questions Reveal Public Moods, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 10, 2006, at
10B.
350. 545 U.S. 469, 482-83 (2005).
351. Monica Davey, Voter Initiatives: Liberals Find Rays of Hope in Ballot Measures, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at P1.
352. See ACKERMAN, supra note 175, at 74-76.
353. See generally TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804 (1994).
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Non-judicial actors settled that great dilemma through a series of
actions, including the Civil War, President Lincoln's consolidation of
presidential
emergency
powers,
and
the
Reconstruction
354
amendments.
When neither of the major candidates in the 1876
presidential election had a majority in the Electoral College, the
determination of who should be declared the winner of the election
was referred to a special commission appointed by the House pursuant
to its authority under the Twelfth Amendment.3 55 After the
commission split strictly along partisan lines to declare Rutherford
Hayes the victor over Samuel Tilden, who had won the popular vote, it
was not the Court but Hayes and Democratic leaders who brokered a
compromise that allowed Hayes to serve a single term in exchange for
ending Reconstruction.3 5 6 In each of these events, non-judicial
authorities negotiated compromises that comprise non-judicial
precedents.
Non-judicial precedents settle other significant legal disputes
as well. Some of the more familiar of these precedents are the
determination that presidential power includes unilaterally removing
executive officials, negotiating treaties, pardoning for any reason, and
vetoing legislation on policy grounds; the House and Senate's
respective understandings of the scope of their respective authorities
in the federal impeachment process; the relevance of "senatorial
courtesy" in judicial and other appointments; and the multiple ways in
3 57
which Congress may authorize Presidents to wage war.
B. Implementing ConstitutionalValues Redux
A growing number of scholars are grappling with the
impediments to imperfect constitutional implementation. Daryl
Levinson, for example, argues that all constitutional rights are over354. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
1-123 (2002) (noting Lincoln's firm resolve that "the rebelling Southern states remained ... a
part of the Union); NICOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 27-29
(2006) (discussing the preservation of the union and the abolition of slavery as the two main
purposes of the Civil War); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUCTION 125-65 (2001) (explaining that Lincoln's call of 75,000 state militia into service
to put down the insurrection after the surrender of Fort Sumter was too powerful to be blocked
by judicial proceedings).
355. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1876, at

115 (2004).
356. WILLIAM A. DEGREGORIO, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF U.S. PRESIDENTS: FROM GEORGE

WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 285-86 (2001).
357. See Whittington, supra note 2, at 804-12. While Whittington does not describe these
extra-judicial interpretations as precedents, the ones he discusses have the distinctive features of
non-judicial precedents which I have discussed, including discoverability.
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and underenforced, which makes it "pointless and indeterminate" to
speculate about the shape of the rights themselves." 358 Although there
is no empirical verification of Levinson's point, it sounds plausible,
given the impossibility of the Court's policing perfect compliance with
its decisions and the likelihood that the branches will not always fall
squarely behind each other's constitutional decisions. Richard Fallon
argues that there may be "a [permissible] gap.., between
constitutional meaning and judicially enforced doctrine. 359 He suggests
the "best rationalizing explanation" of the gap is that some
"background rights" may be properly "aspirational, embodying ideals
that do not command complete and immediate enforcement." 360 Fallon
rejects Kermit Roosevelt's assertions that courts may not ignore
"background rights" and may have different reasons than non-judicial
actors for underenforcing rights, 361 while Fallon and Levinson
maintain that courts do not, as Roosevelt and Mitchell Berman
claim, 362 decide cases first by identifying operative principles and then
363
by crafting decision rules.
Given short shrift in this discourse is the recognition that the
perfect implementation of constitutional values depends on the
interaction between judicial and non-judicial precedents. The problem
is not just with non-judicial actors making comparative assessments
about their relative competence to enforce certain norms or the costs
associated with enforcing those norms. Sometimes, non-judicial actors
directly oppose particular judicial precedents and take actions to
undermine, rather than to facilitate, their implementation. For
example, Brown v. Board of Education failed to be fully implemented,
not because non-judicial actors decided that manageability costs
outweighed the benefits of compliance with Brown, but rather because
there were non-judicial precedents in the forms of traditions, customs,
and norms that were so deeply entrenched in the South that they
impeded the implementation of Brown's full promise. Neither Brown
358. Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialismand Remedial Equilibrium,99 COLUM. L. REV. 857,
924-26 (1999).
359. Richard H. Fallon, JudiciallyManageable Standards and ConstitutionalMeaning, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1317 (2006).
360. Id. at 1324-25.
361. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 HARv. L. REV. F. 193,
197 (2006).
362. See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2004);
Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification:How the Law Becomes What the Court Does,
91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655 (2005).
363. See Fallon, supra note 359, at 1316 (explaining that "courts do not customarily divide
their analyses into two parts, one involving constitutional meaning and the other doctrinal
design").
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nor its progeny could fully displace these precedents, much less be
fully implemented without strong, lasting, and broad support from
364
national political leaders.
Similarly, Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and
George W. Bush did not just underenforce Roe v. Wade; they tried to
undermine it. They used all their prerogatives, including issuing
executive orders withdrawing abortion services for military personnel,
vetoing bills, supporting bills withdrawing financial support for
abortion services, and appointing anti-Roe judges and Justices, to
365
implement their judgment that Roe was a mistake.
Non-judicial responses to Brown and Roe illustrate how nonjudicial authorities, through the precedents they make, democratize
the implementation of the Constitution. Non-judicial precedents are,
in other words, an essential means through which the public is
allowed some say over the implementation of constitutional values.
Congress's response to INS v. Chadha, in which the Court
struck down the legislative veto-an arrangement in which one or
both chambers of Congress or a legislative committee may override an
executive action 366-is illustrative. Dissenting in Chadha, Justice
White lamented that the Court's decision to strike down the one-house
legislative veto "sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory
provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.' "367 Yet,
immediately after Chadha, an angry Congress began finding other
ways to reassert its contrary views about the relationship between the
executive and legislative branches, and in time, it turned the state of
affairs back in the direction of the pre-Chadhaworld. 368 Through its
active resistance to implementing Chadha fully, Congress reached a
point of equipoise with the Court over their different positions on the
constitutionality of legislative vetoes. 369 The ensuing state of
equilibrium reflects how non-judicial actors, most of whom are
politically accountable, bring to bear on the interpretive process their
sensitivity to, and awareness of, public concerns and values.

364. See KLARMAN, supra note 157, at 314-43.
365. See NEAL DEVINS & Louis FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 43-52 (2004)

(discussing how political leaders have influenced the doctrine on abortion rights and several
other constitutional matters).
366. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-59 (1983).
367. Id. at 967 (White, J., dissenting).
368. See Louis Fisher, Legislative Vetoes after Chadha (Cong. Research Serv. Report for
Cong., May 2, 2005) (counting more than 400 legislative vetoes enacted after Chadha).
369. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 205, at 787-800, 1036-39 (discussing the implications of
social science research on equilibrium for understanding the strategic interaction of public
institutions over questions of public law).
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C. The Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty in Perspective

The equilibrium-producing interaction between judicial and
non-judicial precedents also shows how non-judicial actors
democratize constitutional law. In almost all constitutional
adjudication, the question is not whether Justices will disregard
majoritarian preferences, but which expressions of majoritarian
preferences they will follow. In most constitutional cases, the Justices
make decisions based on their constructions of different expressions of
majoritarian
preferences-constitutional
text (ratified by a
supermajority of states and still binding because of societal
acquiescence), original meaning (whose authority depends on its being
synonymous with the constitutional text), tradition (reflecting
majoritarian preferences over time), customs or historical practices
(reflecting how Presidents or members of Congress have understood
their respective powers over time), and judicial precedents (reflecting
what a majority of the Court says).
If so much of what the Court does can be explained as simply
following some manifestation or reflection of majoritarian preferences,
complaints about the counter-majoritarian difficulty in constitutional
law are overstated. It is not credible to castigate many Court decisions
as "counter-majoritarian," when they are attempting to follow or
reflect some expression of majoritarian preferences. Nevertheless, the
counter-majoritarian difficulty is a genuine concern for two reasons.
First, the Court may misread, or follow the wrong expressions
or manifestations of, majoritarian preferences. This complaint is
raised about Atkins v. Virginia, in which the Court relied on "evolving
standards of decency" to strike down a statute authorizing mentally
retarded defendants convicted of certain crimes to be subjected to the
death penalty. 370 The dissent in Atkins charged that "evolving
standards of decency" is less concrete and therefore subject to easier
manipulation than the tangible constitutional judgments of state
authorities on point. 371 Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons, the Court
relied on "the overwhelming weight of international opinion" to
conclude that the Eighth Amendment prohibited states from using the
death penalty against juvenile defendants who had been convicted of
certain crimes, 372 even though "the overwhelming weight of

370. 536 U.S. 304, 319-21 (2002).
371. See id. at 337-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of failing to use objective
factors to inform their judgment as to whether the punishment is consistent with "evolving
standards of decency," instead simply enforcing their own subjective judgment).
372. 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
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international opinion" hardly seems to be as relevant or authoritative
in constitutional adjudication as the official judgments of state
authorities. On the other hand, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck
down Texas's anti-sodomy law based on a societal consensus that it
had identified against criminalizing sodomy, as reflected in the sharp
decline from all fifty states criminalizing the conduct in 1961 to only
thirteen doing so in 2003. 373 Here, the majority grounded its decision
on the fact that most states-and most Americans-disapproved of
such laws, and that there has been no significant effort to reinstate
the laws overturned in Lawrence suggests the Court may not have
been mistaken in its assessment of majoritarian preferences.
Second, the Court sometimes fails to follow any form of
majoritarian preferences. In these cases, the Court is acting, at least
subconsciously, as genuinely counter-majoritarian. For example, in
Furman v. Georgia, the Court struck down all federal and state death
penalty laws then on the books. 374 However, at least thirty-five states
refused to follow Furman and had death penalty laws on the books,
which went into effect when the Court overturned Furman a few years
375
later.
The point is not that judicial decisions are wrong because they
fail to follow majoritarian preferences. Rather, judicial decisions
deviating from concrete expressions of majoritarian preferences are
more vulnerable to attack in the public sector and to the interposition
of non-judicial precedents. The less concrete the form of majoritarian
preferences in which judicial decisions are grounded, the more
vulnerable they are to political attacks. Judicial decisions lacking any
basis in concrete expressions of majoritarian preferences will face
more difficulties than other precedents in being fully implemented and
in developing the requisite network effects to be firmly entrenched in
constitutional law.
Even without the prospect of judicial review, non-judicial
actors follow a legal command that they find in some expression of
majoritarian preferences. They will follow a democratic command that
they deem authoritative. For instance, the directive in Article VI that
"no religious test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office
or public Trust under the United States" 376 depends on non-judicial
authorities for its implementation. Many commentators and senators
believed that President Bush violated this directive when he

373. 539 U.S. 558, 573-99 (2003).
374. See 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
375. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
376. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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acknowledged that he had nominated Harriet Miers to the Supreme
Court based in part on her religious beliefs.3 7 7 The President implicitly
acknowledged his error by withdrawing the nomination and avoiding
the defense of his next nomination on the same basis. Thus, the
withdrawal of Miers's nomination and the subsequent successful
defense of Samuel Alito's nomination on the basis of non-religious
factors vindicated the constitutional commitment to the irrelevance of
nominees' religious convictions to their fitness for public service.
CONCLUSION

Shifting perspective from the Supreme Court to non-judicial
actors will have several beneficial effects on the understanding and
practice of constitutional law. First, non-judicial precedents have in
common the basic characteristic of discoverability-they are past
constitutional judgments or activities of non-judicial actors in which
public authorities try to invest normative authority. They cover a
more extensive range of decisions than judicial precedents do and are
just as enduring. Moreover, they may be categorized by the institution
that produces them, the powers through which they have been
created, and whether they have been designed as binding or
persuasive authority.
Second, historical practices, tradition, customs, and norms are
different sets of non-judicial precedent to which courts defer in
constitutional adjudication. Each of these concepts refers to past
constitutional judgments of non-judicial actors that public authorities,
including courts, have tried to invest with normative authority.
Third, courts are shaped by non-judicial precedents in the
forms of choices made by non-judicial actors about their size,
composition, jurisdiction, and funding. Non-judicial authorities decide
which views to represent on the Court; they decide which judicial
precedents to fortify and which to weaken through appointments.
Fourth, non-judicial precedents have limited force over time.
Several factors limit the extent to which non-judicial precedents
constrain subsequent constitutional decisionmaking, even in
circumstances in which they initially are designed as binding
authority. These factors include the absence of a complete or useful
record for a substantial amount of constitutional activities outside the
Court, the lack of candor in setting forth the bases for non-judicial
actors' constitutional decisions, the different consequences of framing
377. See, e.g., Editorial, Faith and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at A26; Leo Sandon,
Religious Tests for Public Office: Enough Already, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Nov. 5, 2005, at Dl.
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judgments as standards or rules, and the failure for there to be a point
on which a stable majority of a legislature or collegial body agrees.
Fifth, non-judicial precedent performs many functions besides
constraint. These functions include serving as a mode of constitutional
argument; settling constitutional conflicts; facilitating public
dialogues about the Constitution; implementing constitutional values;
and shaping national identity, constitutional structure, and culture.
Each of these functions demonstrates how law in the form of nonjudicial precedent matters. In addition, the greater the network effects
of precedents-the more often they are cited or followed and the more
functions they perform-the more secure their meaning and value
become.
Sixth, non-judicial precedents are instrumental for resolving
some of the most difficult questions in constitutional law. For
example, the prevalence, pervasiveness, and endurance of non-judicial
precedents refute protests that judicial supremacy is a fact of our
constitutional life. Non-judicial precedents settle at least as many, if
not more, constitutional conflicts than do judicial precedents.
Moreover, the fact that most of the Court's decisions are not countermajoritarian, but are grounded in or follow some form of majoritarian
preferences, demonstrates that the counter-majoritarian difficulty is
not as pervasive in constitutional law as many scholars worry. The
judicial precedents most likely to provoke the greatest resistance in
the political process are those that are not grounded in such
expressions or conflict with non-judicial precedents. In addition,
imperfections, or incompleteness, in the implementation of
constitutional values derive either from tensions between non-judicial
and judicial precedents or the failure of non-judicial precedents to be
grounded in some expressions or manifestations of majoritarian
preferences.
Finally, it is impossible to understand constitutional law
without appreciating the realm in which it is most extensively madeoutside the Court-and the relationship between that domain and
what the Court does. Shifting perspective from judicial to non-judicial
precedent illuminates that the Court is supreme within a much
narrower realm than that in which non-judicial precedents are made.
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Although the federal government is traditionally understood
to enjoy exclusive authority over immigration, states and localities
increasingly are assertinga role in this field. This development has
sparked vigorous debate on the propriety of such involvement, but
the debate is predicated on a misunderstanding of the nature of
federal exclusivity. Challenging the conventional wisdom that the
Constitution precludes meaningful state and local involvement in
immigration-a structural preemption argument-this Article
argues that the Constitution allows immigration authority to be
shared among levels of government. After establishing the
correctness of this view of immigration authority, this Article argues
that the constitutionality of state and local involvement should be
assessed through the lens of traditional federalism values. A
federalism lens does not necessarily validate any particularstate or
local regulation, but in lieu of the blunt tool of structural
preemption, it is a far superior means for determining the proper
allocation of immigration authority among levels of government and
will lead to a more nuanced assessment of the interests at stake.

